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The Emerging Constitutional Jurisprudence
of Justice Stevens
Since Justice John Paul Stevens joined the Supreme Court in
the fall of 1975, his course has defied classification. Some observers
have detected a movement into the "liberal bloc" of the Court,
generally viewed as consisting of Justices Brennan and Marshall.'
Yet he has appeared as the "conservative" standard-bearer in several cases of particular importance. 2 In the uncertain decisionmaking of the divided Burger Court, Justice Stevens has assumed a
position of importance by avoiding adherence to the views of either
of the identifiable wings of the Court.
This comment does not attempt to identify a definitive judicial
world-view held by Justice Stevens. His tenure on the Court has
been too brief, and his positions too complex, to make such a generalization possible. Nor does the comment analyze all of the Justice's
written opinions 3 or the totality of his voting record.' Rather, the
scope of our endeavor is more modest: we examine a sample of
Justice Stevens's opinions on constitutional issues, identify those
areas in which his jurisprudence is distinctive, and suggest certain
recurring themes in his constitutional thinking.
The comment begins with an examination of Justice Stevens's
contributions to the particular problems of regulation of offensive
speech, state aid to religion, and fourth amendment protection
against administrative and third-party searches. The focus then
shifts to an analysis of the Justice's opinions on the fifth and fourteenth amendment guarantees of procedural due process and equal
protection. Next, the comment examines the Justice's developing
concern with the rationality of the legislative process-the "due
process of lawmaking." In each of these relatively independent sections, we offer some observations on the Justice's decisionmaking
process and attempt to place his approach in perspective with the
I See, e.g., B. FEiN, SIGNFICANT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1976-77 TERM 13
(1978). Cf. Ball & Uhlman, Justice John Paul Stevens: An Initial Assessment, 1978 B.Y.L.
REy. 567, 581 (concluding that Justice Stevens must be characterized as a centrist).
2 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978); FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978).
Since his arrival on the Court, Justice Stevens has written more opinions than any
other Justice, See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HAlv. L. REv. 1, 327 (1978); The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAav. L. REv. 1, 295 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term,
90 HAav. L. REv. 1, 276 (1976).
The voting records of each Justice are compiled yearly in the November issue of the
Harvard Law Review. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 3, at 327-30.
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current doctrine of the Burger Court. Finally, the comment draws
some generalizations from the Justice's constitutional analysis and
offers an evaluation of his emerging jurisprudence.
I.

REGULATION OF OFFENSIVE SPEECH

Few areas of constitutional adjudication have so divided and
perplexed the Supreme Court and legal commentators as has the
accommodation of the first amendment's protection of freedom of
speech to the regulation of obscenity' and, more recently, sexrelated speech falling short of the obscene.6 At no time in recent
history has the Court reached a wide consensus on these issues. In
his brief tenure on the Court, Justice Stevens has outlined a position
that departs significantly from the views of his fellow Justices. In
order to understand this departure, it is necessary to review the
recent history of Supreme Court decisions regarding obscenity.
A.

Development of Obscenity Doctrine

The history of the Court's recent obscenity doctrine begins with
Roth v. United States.7 In his majority opinion in Roth, Justice
Brennan argued that obscenity is "utterly without redeeming social
importance" 8 and for that reason not within the range of speech the
first amendment protects. The resulting distinction between protected and unprotected speech-which was to dominate the Court's
thinking until the appointment of Justice Stevens-eliminated any
question regarding the status of obscene speech: it was unprotected
and could be regulated? Yet the Court's distinction left the potentially more intractable problem of defining "obscenity". 0 Roth of"No other aspect of the First Amendment has, in recent years, demanded so substantial
a commitment of our time, generated such disharmony of views, and remained so resistant
to the formulation of stable and manageable standards." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
390 U.S. 676, 704-05 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978); Young v. American MiniTheatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
7 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Id. at 484.
Once a given item was adjudged "obscene," its dissemination could be enjoined, e.g.,
McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976), its distributor could be jailed, e.g., Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), and all copies could be destroyed, e.g., Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 444 (1957).
" Not all members of the Court during that period considered the definition of obscenity
dispositive. Justices Douglas and Black believed the government powerless to regulate even
obscene speech. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 379-80 (1971)
(Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 49192 (1966) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)
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fered the first of many formulations of the proper test: "[w]hether
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest."" Nine years later, Justice Brennan, writing in
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"
v. Attorney General," propounded a more stringent test: "(a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because
it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material
is utterly without redeeming social value."'"
The fragile consensus achieved by the "Memoirs test" was
short-lived. For a period of six years," in which at least thirty-one
obscenity cases reached the Court, 5 majority support could not be
found on the Court for any one definition, and all decisions were
made summarily after inspection of the materials by the Justices. 6
During this period the Court acted as an "unreviewable board of
censorship,"' 7 relying on subjective judgment and providing no
guidance for future decisions. By 1973, virtually all members of the
Court had lost faith in their ability to articulate any workable test
for obscenity. Three members of the Court, led by Justice Brennan," decided that the Court was "manifestly unable" to define
(Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan believed that the federal government is limited to regulating "hardcore
pornography," but that the states may regulate "any material which, taken as a whole, has
been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to treat with sex in a fundamentally
offensive manner, under rationally established criteria for judging such material." Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 204 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11354 U.S. at 489 (citing cases).
12383 U.S. 413 (1966). Only Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas joined Justice
Brennan in the plurality opinion. Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart concurred on broader
grounds; the plurality's test therefore governed the later disposition of obscenity cases. The
principal distinction between the Roth and Memoirs tests was that the lack of "redeeming
social value" shifted from being a justification for regulating obscenity under Roth to an
element of the definition of obscenity under Memoirs. See L. TRmE, AMEmICAN CONSTrruMONAL LAW

§ 12-16, at 661 (1978).

,' 383 U.S. at 418.
" This period, from 1967 to 1973, began with Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967),
and ended with the new standards in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
11The cases are collected in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 n.8 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
'1 If a majority agreed with the court of appeals that the material was obscene, it would
deny certiorari. If it disagreed, it would grant certiorari and summarily reverse.
, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 n.3 (1973).
1 Justice Brennan had authored the Roth and Memoirs tests. In his change of mind, he
was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall. The position taken by these three Justices has
remained constant in the five years since Miller. They have since consistently dissented from
affirmances of criminal obscenity convictions, see, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,
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obscenity "except by reference to concepts so elusive that they fail
to distinguish clearly between protected and unprotected speech."'"
They concluded that the Court must abandon all attempts to regulate obscenity beyond those seeking to protect juveniles and nonconsenting adults. 20 These three Justices thus moved closer to the
stance of Justice Douglas, who steadfastly maintained his view that
the first amendment prohibits any regulation of obscenity at all. 21
A new majority of five was, however, able to coalesce around a
single view in Miller v. California.2 2 The Court defined obscenity in
a manner similar to the Memoirs test, but eliminated the requirement that the material be "utterly without redeeming social
value." 1 More significant than the definition was the new approach
to adjudication under this standard: the determination of obscenity
would be made on the basis of individual community standards, as
decided by juries. The Court described as "essentially questions of
fact" 24 the juries' determinations regarding prurient interest and
patent offensiveness. It noted that "our Nation is simply too big and
too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards
could be articulated for all 50 states in a single formulation, even
assuming the prerequisite consensus exists."' The majority's answer to the apparent impracticability of defining "obscenity" was
thus to relinquish primary control of the definition to juries in the
fifty states. Although community variations are not without limits,2 6
310 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting), joined or concurred in reversals of such convictions, see,
e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring), and dissented from
denials of certiorari in cases involving criminal obscenity convictions, see, e.g., Millican v.
Unites States, 418 U.S. 947, 947 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan carefully limited his conclusion to cases not involving minors or
"obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults." See id. at 113.
21 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
- 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, was joined by
Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.
21Id. at 24-25, 37 (quoting Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419) (emphasis added). The new Miller
test for obscenity was:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards," would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . [Roth]; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24.
24 Id. at 30.
2 Id.
" See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974) (overturning a jury's determination
that the film "Carnal Knowledge" was obscene). Thus, jury determinations are fixed by
"substantive constitutional limitations, deriving from the First Amendment."
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the Court now shows deference to local determinations, both under
state obscenity laws and under federal laws.
B. Regulation of "Less Protected" Speech: The Importance of
Context
When he joined the Court, Justice Stevens thus faced two opposing viewpoints. The Court majority, unable to precisely define
obscenity on a national basis, deferred largely to local determinations. The minority, similarly unable to define the term, declined
to permit regulation of obscenity under most circumstances. If the
Justices agreed that obscenity fell outside the realm of protected
speech, they divided sharply on whether the definitional problem
precluded regulation of obscenity in a manner anticipated by the
protected/unprotected distinction. Justice Stevens has apparently
sided with the minority in concluding both that a nationwide definition is impracticable and that community standards are an undesirable substitute for first amendment protection. But he has developed from these conclusions a very different analysis of the proper
scope of first amendment protection.
The nature of Justice Stevens's analysis appears most starkly
in his dissent in Smith v. United States.2 7 Smith concerned a federal
prosecution for mailing obscene materials. Following its approach
in Miller, the majority upheld a conviction reached according to the
community standards of Iowa, even though the statute allegedly
violated was federal.2 Justice Stevens, in contrast, considered it
"obvious" that a "federal statute defining a criminal offense should
prescribe a uniform standard applicable throughout the country. '29
He reasoned that the diversity that made a national standard of
offensiveness impossible to identify also precluded definition of
state standards. The assumption that jurors know the private tastes
and values of their neighbors "does not apply to most segments of
our diverse, mobile, metropolitan society."3 Finally, he argued that
"in some ways the community standard concept is even more objectionable than a national standard,

31

largely because of the subjec-

- 431 U.S. 291, 311 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
- 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976). At the time of petitioner's alleged crimes, the state of Iowa
had prescribed no applicable standards for judging obscenity. The majority concluded that
the jury was able to determine community standards without such a legislative definition.
431 U.S. at 301-08.
" 431 U.S. at 312 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 314 n.10.
1' Id. at 314.
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tivity, unreliability, and unreviewability of jury determinations of
obscenity.
Although voting with the dissenters to invalidate criminal convictions based on such determinations, Justice Stevens refused to
join in their conclusion that the inability of the judiciary to define
obscenity precluded most state action against sexually explicit
speech. Rather, in a striking departure from the position of the
minority, he concluded that the definitional problems would be
ameliorated if local regulation operated through civil rather than
criminal liability. "[T]he line between communications which
'offend' and those which do not," he conceded, "is too blurred to
identify criminal conduct. It is also too blurred to delimit the protections of the first amendment.""2 The blur, however, becomes a
flexibility that is itself a "desirable feature" when part of a civil rule
designed to protect "the individual's right to select the kind of environment in which he wants to live. 33 Quoting Justice Sutherland's
famous aphorism in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 34 "[a]
nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place-like a pig
in the parlor instead of the barnyard," Justice Stevens argued that
nuisance law provides the most suitable means of regulating the
varieties of offensive speech and the circumstances in which it appears without depriving it of all its first amendment protection.
Such an approach becomes possible, however, only upon the
abandonment of Roth's strict dichotomy of protected and unprotected speech. If the first amendment makes certain speech inviolable, no regulation, even civil sanctions keyed to the context in which
the speech appears, is permissible and the need to distinguish unprotected from protected speech-to define obscenity-reappears.
As a result, Justice Stevens in Smith necessarily rejected outright
the notion that "all communications within the protected area are
equally immune from governmental restraint, whereas those outside
that area are utterly without social value and, hence, deserving of
no protection." 35 Moreover, he recognized a class of speech, ranging
from unprotected obscene speech to protected nonobscene, but sexually related speech, that may be regulated depending on its context, "[a]s long as the government does not totally suppress protected speech and is faithful to its paramount obligation of complete
3 Id. at 316. See also Rendleman, Civilizing Pornography:The Case for an Exclusive
CHI. L. REv. 509 (1977).

Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U.
3 431 U.S. at 317.

- 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926), quoted at 431 U.S. at 317.
3431 U.S. at 318.
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neutrality with respect to the point of view expressed."',
In support of his rejection of the Roth dichotomy, Justice Stevens cited his earlier opinion in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc. 7 Mini Theatres not only provides a lengthy justification for
distinguishing among varieties of protected speech, it also indicates
how Justice Stevens's analysis operates in practice. In Mini
Theatres, operators of two adult movie theatres challenged a Detroit
"anticlustering" zoning ordinance prohibiting certain specifically
defined "regulated uses"-for example, adult bookstores, adult
movie theaters, or cabarets featuring topless or nude dancing 38-within one thousand feet of more than two other such uses.
After disposing of vagueness39 and straight first amendment
claims," Justice Stevens directed his attention primarily to the operators' argument that the statute denied them equal protection
because it discriminated against certain movie theaters on the basis
of the content of their films.4 ' He admitted that some Supreme
Court cases, read literally and without regard to their facts, "would
absolutely preclude any regulation of expressive activity predicated
in whole or in part on the content of the communication." 2 Nevertheless, the Justice pointed out that in many situations the Court
had endorsed discrimination between forms of speech on the basis
of content. 3 Thus, he concluded that lines could be drawn between
3Id.

v 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Stevens, J.).
mAn "adult theater" was defined as one which presents "material distinguished or
characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual
Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas.'" Id. at 53. These terms, in turn, were precisely
defined. "Specified Anatomical Areas," for example, included "[11ess than completely and
opaquely covered: (a) human genitals, pubic region, (b) buttock, and (c) female breast below
a point immediately above the top of the areola." Id. at 53 n.4.
" Justice Stevens found that the statute "unquestionably" applied to the respondents,
id. at 58-59, and that they lacked standing to challenge vagueness with respect to other
persons because the case did not concern a threat to the maintenance of "a free and open
market for the interchange of ideas." Id. at 60. This disposition foreshadowed Justice Stevens's constitutional argument that sexually explicit speech is entitled to less protection than
other, more important forms of speech. See text and notes at notes 55-63 infra.
11The first amendment claim was rejected because all movie theaters were subject to
presumably valid zoning regulations. The only reason for respondents' challenge was that
some movie houses were treated differently from others. This claim was considered under the
rubric of equal protection.
1 In his equal protection analysis, Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Powell, who joined in the other portions of the
opinion, concurred separately on the equal protection issue.
42 427 U.S. at 65 (discussing Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)).
0 Among the areas in which the Court has approved discrimination on the basis of the
content of speech, Justice Stevens discussed incitement to crime or violence, fighting words,
release of wartime information, defamation of public officials, commercial speech, and obscenity. Id. at 66-70 (citing cases).
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sexually explicit and other speech "without violating the government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication."" More specifically, he said that "society's
interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different,
and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political
debate."'" In explaining this distinction, Justice Stevens noted that
"few of us would march our sons or daughters off to war to preserve
the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in
the theatres of our choice.""
Having decided that such discrimination was permissible, Justice Stevens had no difficulty in upholding the Detroit ordinance.
Evidence had been introduced tending to show that concentration
of adult movie theaters was related to neighborhood deterioration
and increases in crime.47 Applying a low level of scrutiny,"s Justice
Stevens noted that "the city's interest in attempting to preserve the
quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect,""
and he concluded that "the city's interest in the present and future
character of its neighborhoods adequately supports its classification
of motion pictures." 50
In sum, the analysis of Smith and Mini Theatres develops two
central themes. First, government may restrict speech on the basis
of its content when the speech, although not wholly outside the
protection of the first amendment, is so far removed from the fundamental concerns of the amendment that its limitation will not seriously impair basic liberties. Second, to preserve the free marketplace of ideas and government neutrality within it, government regulation, when tied to content, must not unduly restrict speech and
must not favor any particular viewpoint. Thus, for example, Justice
Stevens concluded that sexually related speech, as distinguished
" Id.
45Id.
" Id.

at 70.

,Id. at 71 & n.34.
" Mini Theatres reflects a highly deferential approach to the problem, given the first
amendment implications. Such a minimal level of scrutiny is ordinarily reserved for economic
matters. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). But by characterizing
the Detroit ordinance as "nothing more than a limitation on the place where adult films may
be exhibited," 427 U.S. at 71, Justice Stevens does effectively treat Mini Theatres as a case
of economic regulation-a zoning problem. Cf. id. at 73-84 (Powell, J., concurring) (explicitly
treating Mini Theatres as a zoning case with only incidental effect on speech). Justice Stevens
did not discuss alternative means of achieving the same results without so stifling a classification; this also is consistent with economic equal protection. See Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection,82 HARv.L. Rav. 1065, 1082-87 (1969).
, 427 U.S. at 71.

Id. at 72.
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from political speech, is not fully protected and may be regulated
even if it is not obscene. At the same time, all such material, even
when obscene, is "entitled to at least a modicum of First Amendment protection,"51 so that the only permissible regulation is that
seeking to abate a "nuisance"-such as public displays of erotic
materials 2 or dissemination to juveniles 53-or serving some significant state interest-such as the prevention of urban blight. If the
speech offends no one and the state asserts no true interest, the
Justice noted, "we must rely on the capacity of the free marketplace
of ideas to distinguish that which is useful or beautiful from that
which is ugly or worthless."5 4
The role of context in determining the permissible regulation
of less-protected speech, as well as the definition of this category of
speech itself, is further elaborated in Justice Stevens's opinion for
55
the Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.
Pacifica concerned an
FCC warning issued to a radio station that broadcast George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words," which satirizes society's verbal
mores, largely by repeating various expletives in different combinations. 6 The Justice reaffirmed his break with the Roth approach by
permitting civil regulation of profane speech, which had previously
been understood as fully protected. Responding for the Court to the
question "[w]hether a broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and excretion may be regulated because of its content, ' 57 Justice Stevens asserted that the words in the Carlin mono" 431 U.S. at 312.
51Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (disallowing prohibition of

explicit films at drive-in movie theaters). Justice Stevens distinguished Erznoznik in Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34, on the grounds that the secondary effect in Erznoznikdisruption of traffic-would also result from nonexplicit films. The distinction is hardly
compelling: theaters showing nonexplicit films might also have a deleterious effect on neighborhoods. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Note, The Chilling Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69 COLUM. L. Rav. 808 (1969).
0 Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding conviction for selling to a

16-year old materials that were not obscene for adults).
" Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 321 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).

- 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, was joined in the entirety
of his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justices Powell and Blackmun
concurred, differing with Justice Stevens's conclusion that sexually explicit speech is less
valuable than other forms of speech. They relied instead on the distinctive character of the
broadcast media as a justification for increased governmental regulation. Id. at 3046-47 (PoW-

ell, J., concurring).
sI The Carlin monologue is reprinted as an appendix to the opinion of the Court. Id. at
3041-43 app.
57Id. at 3038 (Stevens, J.). The dissenting Justices, Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and

White, argued that the constitutional issue need not be reached. They would have construed
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logue "lack literary, political, or scientific value," but nevertheless
"are not entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment."58
He concluded that the degree of protection accorded such speech
varies with the context in which it occurs, and that radio broadcasting is so uniquely pervasive in the lives of Americans, intruding even
into the home, and so uniquely accessible to children that the FCC
acted within its powers in issuing the warning.59 The holding was
limited to its facts; "a host of variables" made the FCC action
appropriate." Again alluding to the words of Justice Sutherland,
Justice Stevens concluded: "We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its
regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."',
Justice Stevens emphasized that the scope of permissible regulation is narrowly circumscribed. When speech offends because of
the speaker's opinion, protection is required: 2 the government must
remain neutral when political and social opinions are concerned.
Thus, "[i]f there were any reason to believe that the Commission
characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could be
traced to its political content-or even to the fact it satirized contemporary attitudes about four letter words-First Amendment
protection might be required." 3 But if, as Justice Stevens found in
Pacifica, the regulation goes only to the character and impact of the
speech, rather than to the opinion it expresses, it will be upheld.
C.

Implications for First Amendment Doctrine

On its face, Justice Stevens's approach to the first amendment
in Mini Theatres and Pacificarepresents a reasonable accommodation of the interests of both the individual and the community by
striking a balance between free expression and the need to mitigate
those effects of unrestricted speech customarily viewed as most
threatening to the community. This balancing occurs at two levels.
First, a balancing of individual and community interests takes place
in resolving the question presented in any particular case. In Mini
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) to limit the FCC's censorship powers to obscene speech. See 98 S.Ct.
at 3055-56.
s Id. at 3039.
, Id. at 3040-41.
" Id. at 3041. Especially important was the fact that the broadcast was made in the
afternoon, a time when children were likely to be listening. Justice Stevens did not make clear
what degree of scrutiny the Court should apply to the particulars of the regulatory body's

decision regarding context.
61Id.
2
13

Id. at 3038.
Id. at 3038-39.
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Theatres, for example, Justice Stevens upheld the legitimacy of the
Detroit ordinance in part by reference to the strength of the state
interest underlying it-the preservation of urban neighborhoods" 4-and in part by reference to the weakness of the opposing
individual interest-the absence of any claim that the ordinance in
any way diminished either the individual's access to sexually explicit material or the theater owner's right to distribute such
material."
Mini Theatres also involved balancing of a more general sort.
Justice Stevens's very conclusion that sexually explicit speech, as a
class, is entitled to less than full first amendment protection presupposes a weighing of the potential such material exhibits for contributing to the marketplace of ideas against the threat it may pose to
other societal interests. Justice Stevens nowhere explains how he
reached his determination of the relationship between sexually explicit speech and the first amendment, but the most compelling
argument may simply be historic. Faced with long-standing public,
legislative, and judicial concern about the impact of such materials,
Justice Stevens has tried to develop a reasonable, pragmatic approach to the regulation of such materials that frankly accepts society's low valuation of them and at the same time protects basic
first amendment values.
The practical advantage of the Justice's approach, with its appeal to common sense, should not obscure the problems in his position. Even apart from his questionable use of precedent regarding
the Court's previous ventures into content-based classification,"
Justice Stevens's attempt to apply a balancing approach is troubling in that it seems to proceed from an inadequately articulated
set of principles defining the first amendment interests it seeks to
protect. In particular, in appearing to jettison the strict requirement
that an utterance share "no essential part of any exposition of
ideas" before it can be regulated, 7 the Justice creates the possibility
of a considerably broader and more nebulous class of regulable expression than that heretofore held unprotected. Perhaps because the
unifying principle behind these less-protected forms of speech is
unclear-consisting solely of the principle that some speech is so far
" 427 U.S. at 55, 71 & n.34.

Id. at 62, 71-72.
As the dissenters in Mini Theatres were quick to note, id. at 85-87, none of the cases
in which the Court had looked to content involved discrimination among different types of
protected speech. Rather, the Court was generally concerned with the question whether the
speech at issue fell within a protected category.
17 Pacifica, 98 S. Ct. at 3039 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942) (fighting words)).
"
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from the concerns of the first amendment that the need to protect
it is "of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest
in untrammeled political debate" 6 -Justice Stevens fails to delineate the categories of speech that fall within the broader class and
to discuss why they fall there. In Smith and Mini Theatres, for
example, the concern was with sexually related speech, but the
Justice never indicated whether such speech forms a separate category of less-protected speech. Furthermore, the Justice's aphoristic
statement of his working principle for determining the value of
speech" offers a standard that varies not just with the sensibilities
of local communities, but with the shifting political climate as well.
Pacifica underscores the problem of categorization by placing
profanity within the range of permissible content regulation. As
Justice Stevens insisted, profanity shares with sexually explicit
0
speech a focus on the "intimacies" of "certain bodily functions" ' 771
and often offends "for the same reasons that obscenity offends."
Because profanity engenders social concerns that are quite distinct
from those tied to obscenity and the like,72 however, if it is viewed
as a part of the category of sexually related and hence less-protected
speech, profanity weakens the theoretical unity of that category. On
the other hand, if viewed as a new category of less-protected speech,
profanity raises the questions whether such a category has a principled basis and whether any clear and sensible limit on the number
and variety of less-protected categories is available. The effect is to
allow the classification of speech as less protected to turn primarily
on the extent to which the community finds it objectionable,
a result threatening to both the marketplace of ideas and the goal
of governmental neutrality.
The second theme of Justice Stevens's free speech analysis
seemingly responds to this latter difficulty by limiting governmental
regulation of the content of any speech.73 This formulation of a
content-neutral requirement, however, departs from the Court's
earlier decisions recognizing that the first amendment must protect
the "emotive function" of speech as well as its "cognitive content."'4
"

Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70.

0 See text and notes at notes 45-46 supra.

7'98 S.Ct. at 3039 n.23.
" Id. at 3039 (footnote omitted).
See Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of FirstAmendment Protection,
9 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1974).
13 See text and notes at notes 62763 supra.
71 "[Miuch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not
only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
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A speaker may directly intend his particular form of political or
social expression to evoke strong emotional responses from his audiences: nazis may choose to march in Jewish suburbs, the Ku Klux
Klan may demonstrate in black neighborhoods, abortion opponents
may offer pictorial or verbal descriptions specifically designed to
shock and alarm. Although the cognitive content may not be the
most important element in such speech, denial or restriction of the
speaker's chosen form of communication still constitutes a restriction on the freedom to communicate. The formulation is no more
defensible, moreover, when viewed, as Justice Stevens indicates it
might be,7 5 in the more familiar guise of an attempt to restrict form
rather than content. So long as human communication retains its
subtle character as a union of form and substance, such a distinction will be illusory.7"
Nor can this difficulty in Justice Stevens's focus on the source
of the offense be remedied by seeking to restrict only the deleterious
"secondary effects" of offensive speech.7 7 Such a distinction suffers
from the same difficulties surrounding the distinction between form
and content. The nuisance effects of speech may be the result of
nothing more than the community's reaction to such speech: the
deterioration of neighborhoods as a result of a proliferation of movie
houses exhibiting sexually explicit films may itself be a reaction of
the community to such films. The desire to protect children and
unwilling listeners from profane language is equally a reflection of
the social response to certain speech. To the extent one can separate
such effects from the simple social desire to isolate the community
from offending language, the same analysis could be applied to deny
protection to political speech that is likely to evoke a violent reaction in certain members of the community. In short, to assert that
certain speech may be regulated because of its effects upon the
community is specifically to sanction under the Constitution a censorial role for the community that is inconsistent with the Justice's
78
basic analytical framework.
It is important to keep the significance of Justice Stevens's
opinions in perspective. The results reached by the Justice in Mini
Theatres and Pacifica are in themselves probably not objectiona11Pacifica, 98 S.Ct. at 3037 n.18. See also id. at 3038-39 (first amendment protection
might be needed if Carlin monologue were offensive because of its political or satirical content, rather than its sexually and scatalogically explicit mode of expression).
11See id. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The idea that the content of a message and
its potential impact on any who might receive it can be divorced from the words that are the
vehicle for its expression is transparently fallacious.").
"7See generally L. TiunE, supra note 12, § 12-20.
" See text and notes at notes 30-31 supra.
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ble. 9 The regulation of speech in Pacifica, for example, involved
only the issue of a warning letter to a participant in a highly regulated industry-an industry in which the government exercises considerable control over program content in other areas."0 Justice Stevens was careful to limit the decision to its particular facts, and so
limited it poses little danger to freedom of expression. It is not the
soundness of Justice Stevens's individual decisions that is troublesome; it is the failure of his case-by-case adjudication to provide
workable principles for future decisionmaking. The Justice based
both his Pacifica and Mini Theatres opinions on similar broad rationales, upholding a species of content regulation in two different
contexts. Yet these opinions offer virtually no guidance to legislators
or lower courts in determining the proper limits of such regulation.
Justice Stevens has yet to face the difficult line-drawing problems his approach entails. Perhaps he should not be faulted for
failing to decide cases not yet before him. Assuming, as Justice
Stevens does, that some government regulation of speech is justified, the Justices's approach does focus on factors that must be
considered if regulation is to rest upon a firm and principled basis.
The context in which a given speech act occurs, the extent to
which the speech implicates the fundamental purposes of the
first amendment, and the governmental motive in restricting the
speech are -significant variables in any calculus of the scope of permissible regulation. The Justice's refusal to validate classifications based on the political content of speech and his insistence that
regulation not impose debilitating restrictions on access to the marketplace for any speech reflects his commitment to preserving the
role of the individual as the arbiter of the value of particular speech
acts. Nevertheless, his pragmatic approach to first amendment ad" One's opinion of Justice Stevens's free-speech jurisprudence is, to a large extent, a
matter of one's political point of view: to those who emphasize personal freedom, Mini
Theatres and Pacificaintroduce a dangerous doctrine; to those who would accept greater state
control of communication, these cases provide a welcome dose of common sense.
" Political speech of broadcasters is subject to regulation under the fairness doctrine and
other FCC regulations. See, e.g., Editorializing By Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246
(1949). See also 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970) (congressional approval of the fairness doctrine).
Indeed, the discussion of public issues is in some ways more closely regulated than other forms
of speech, such as product commercials. See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 26 (1974). The
fairness doctrine was held not to violate the first amendment in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, distinguished the
broadcast media from other media such as the printed press on the basis of the scarcity of
the airways and the public trusteeship role of the broadcast licensee. Courts have also claimed
that broadcasting is so pervasive and intrusive as to make listeners a "captive audience." See,
e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127-28 (1673). Given this special status
of broadcasted speech, in which first amendment freedoms are less highly protected, Justice
Stevens's conclusion that profanity over the airwaves may be regulated is not surprising.

-
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judication and his failure to enunciate for the lower courts the precise dimensions of the less-protected speech category may result in
greater intrusions on the freedom of expression than he would be
willing to countenance.
I.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The establishment clause of the first amendment provides simply that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion." 8 ' The principal purpose of the provision was to prevent
the institution of an established church in the United States. 2 More
broadly, the provision has been viewed as prohibiting federal or
state encouragement of any kind of religion-whether a specific sect
or religion in general.13 In defining these limitations in the area of
state aid to sectarian education, the Court has developed a threepart test. To pass constitutional muster, a statute providing aid
must have a "secular legislative purpose," it must, in primary effect, neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not "foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' ' 84 In practice,

this test has not always led to predictable results, especially in cases
involving aid to private schools," in which, as one member of the
Court has noted, the decisions "draw lines that often must seem
arbitrary.""
Characteristically, Justice Stevens has declined to follow the
majority on its current path. His course, however, seems strangely
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
" See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church.").
0 See id. ("Neither [a state nor the Federal Government] can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence
a person . . . to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.").
I" Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973).
" The Court has approved provision of money for bus transportation to parents of private
school pupils, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), release of public school pupils
for off-campus religious instruction during school hours, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952), loan of textbooks to private school students, Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968), and construction of facilities for religiously affiliated colleges and universities, Tilton
v. Richardshon, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), while disallowing religous instruction within public
school classrooms during the school day, McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948),
offering of prayers-even nonsectarian ones-in public schools, Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), provision of salary supplements to teachers of nonreligious
subjects in sectarian schools, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), tax relief or tuition
reimbursement for parents of private school pupils, Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), and loans of instructional materials other than
textbooks to private schools or school children, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
A Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
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at odds with his usual tendency to shun general rules in favor of
decisions carefully calibrated to the facts of the case.8 7 He has
adopted the view that "a state subsidy of sectarian schools is invalid
regardless of the form it takes."8 In Roemer v. Board of Public
Works, 89 his first establishment clause opinion, Justice Stevens dissented from a decision upholding the constitutionality of a Maryland program providing noncategorical grants-restricted to nonsectarian purposes-to
private colleges and universities. He
"substantially" 0 agreed with Justice Brennan's dissent,9 which focused on the program's subsidy of religious activity. Justice Stevens
also wrote a one paragraph dissent to "add emphasis to the pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt religious schools to com''2
promise their religious mission without wholly abandoning it.
Justice Stevens again dissented in Wolman v. Walter.3 In
Wolman the Court94 approved an Ohio statute providing nonpublic
school pupils with books, standardized testing and scoring-services,
diagnostic services, and therapeutic and remedial services, but
struck down the statute's aid for instructional materials and equipment and field trip transportation. 5 With the exception of the diagnostic and therapeutic services-which he compared to public
health services 5 -Justice Stevens would not permit any of the assisSee, e.g., text and notes at notes 64-69 supra and notes 323-345 infra.
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265 (1975) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
U 426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun wrote for a plurality, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell. Justices White and Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.
, Id.
Id. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
,2Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
,3433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
" Justice Blackmun wrote for the plurality, although only parts of his opinion are labeled the opinion of the Court. Justice Stewart apparently joined all parts of his opinion.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and White agreed with those sections upholding
the aid, and dissented from those sections striking it down. Justice Powell agreed with those
sections upholding the aid, and with that section striking down the grant of instructional
materials and equipment, but dissented from the decision to strike down the aid for field
trips. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens agreed with the sections striking down the
aid, agreed with the sections upholding the therapeutic and diagnostic services, and dissented
from the sections upholding all other forms of aid.
" The rationale for the Court's distinction among the types of aid is somewhat obscured
by the organization of the opinion, which analyzes each type of aid individually, without
making comparisons. With the exception of the diagnostic and therapeutic services, at least
six of the Justices perceived no constitutional distinction among the other types of aid.
" 433 U.S. at 266. The diagnostic and therapeutic services related primarily to speech
and hearing defects. The programs were not integrated into the school regimen; for example,
the therapeutic services were provided in mobile units located away from the private school
grounds. Id. at 241, 245 (plurality opinion).
'7
U

19781

The Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens

tance. All of the aid, he said, supports "the school's educational
mission, which at heart is religious. 97 The Justice advocated abandonment of the three-part test used by the plurality and a return
to the rule in Everson v. Board of Education:8 "No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion."" Under the three-part
test, Justice Stevens said, "[w]hat should be a 'high and impregnable' wall between church and state, has been reduced to a 'blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier.' "100
Justice Stevens's position may best be explained by his concentration on the adverse effects of state aid on religious institutions,
rather than by the effects of state aid to religion on nonbelievers or
on the polity. In his Wolman dissent, he twice referred to Clarence
Darrow's remark in the Scopes trial that when religion has received
support from the state, "it has harmed both the public and the
religion that it would pretend to serve."'' Accordingly, Justice Stevens was not swayed by the considerable public benefits accruing
from aid to private education. 1 2 In Wolman he illustrated the
"pernicious tendency. . . to tempt religious schools to compromise
their religious mission" with two practical examples.10 3 The Ohio
statute, he pointed out, caused the religious schools to "relinquish
their religious exclusivity"10 4 -a requirement for receiving funds.
Moreover, he noted, the statute would pressure the private schools
to avoid textbooks that "present a religious perspective on secular
subjects"'0 5 so that they may be paid for by the state.
Justice Powell's statement that "at this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the
Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of
'7

Id. at 265 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

" 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
" Id. at 16.
N 433 U.S. at 266 (quoting

id. at 236 (plurality opinion (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)))) (footnote omitted).
"1 433 U.S. at 264, 266. See also A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 298 (Anchor
Books ed. 1969) ("Hence any alliance with any political power whatsoever is bound to be
burdensome for religion. It does not need their support in order to live, and in serving them

it may die.").
112 According

to Justice Powell, some of the public benefits from aid to private schools

are: the provision of educational alternatives apart from the sectarian purpose, the stimulus
to competition in the educational industry, the relief from the expense of educating all
children in public schools, and the facilitation of high quality education. 433 U.S. at 262
(Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
,6 Id. at 266 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
IN Id.
IN Id.
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Rights,"'' 8 may be correct with regard to the creation of a state
church. The novelty of Justice Stevens's position lies not in his
disagreement with Justice Powell's assertion, but in his invocation
of a concern that has not traditionally influenced the Court's development of establishment clause doctrine: the insidious tendency of
state money to secularize recipient institutions. 117 The restrictions
on state aid to sectarian schools imposed under the three-part test
combined with the growing dependence of such schools on state aid
for financial survival make this a peculiarly contemporary concern.
If it is acknowledged that the potential secularization of religious
institutions is an evil Within the purview of the establishment prohibition, Justice Stevens's absolutist position0 8 may be required to
prevent that secularization.
III. PROTECTION FROM GOVERNMENT SEARCHES
The fourth amendment protects the "right of the people to be
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."'0 9
Historically, the doctrinal content of the amendment has been
ill-defined." 0 The Court has had particular difficulty forging a
1" Id. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
107In an age in which government has increased tremendously in size, government
"largesse" may be as great a threat to the independent and diverse development of religious
institutions as was direct government association in an earlier time. It may be true that the
framers were little aware of this danger. Nevertheless, to the extent that state aid to religion
encourages homogenization and secularization of religious institutions, prohibition of that aid
may be entirely consistent with the goals of the establishment clause. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 12, § 14-3, at 816-19; Gianelli, Religious Liberty, Non-Establishment, and Doctrinal
Development PartII, The Non-EstablishmentPrinciple,81 HARv. L. Rav. 513, 516-26 (1968).
10 Although Justice Stevens appears to have taken an absolutist position regarding state
aid to sectarian schools, he apparently has not adopted such a strict position in other areas
of potential church-state conflict. For example, in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 725 (1976), decided the same day as Roemer, Justice Stevens joined Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting from the decision that a state court has no power to interfere with the
judgment of a hierarchical church concerning leadership of the church. Justices Rehnquist
and Stevens argued that the civil courts of the state have authority to resolve conflicting
claims to real property, and that to do so requires investigation beyond mere "ecclesiastical
paper title." Id. at 726.
'U.S.

CONST. amend. IV.

See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). The Court has acknowledged that
its body of fourth amendment precedent is "something less than a seamless web." Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973). The lack of a consistent fourth amendment doctrine
has not escaped the attention of the commentators: "The absence of a continuously developing rationalization of the amendment has enabled the Court to change direction, even to veer
rapidly and sharply, without too obvious inconsistency; but the result is a body of doctrine
that is unstable and unconvincing." Weinreb, Generalities of the FourthAmendment, 42 U.
"'
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consistent interpretation of the relationship between the amendment's two clauses."' Although members of the Court agree that the
amendment generally is a safeguard against arbitrary governmental
intrusions into individual privacy,"' a majority of the Justices of the
Burger Court adhere to the view that the protection against unreasonable searches guaranteed by the first clause is achieved primarily
by requiring that searches be conducted pursuant to judicially authorized warrants" 3 issued upon probable cause. Thus, in its recent
decisions the Court has treated compliance with the warrant requirement as the touchstone for determining the "reasonableness"
of a search, relying on earlier statements that "[e]xcept in certain
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property withunless it has been authorized
out proper consent is 'unreasonable'
4
warrant.""1
search
by a valid
Recent difficulties with the Court's view of the reasonableness
and warrant provisions are attributable to two landmark fourth
amendment developments in 1967. In the first of these, Camara v.
Municipal Court,"' the Court held that, absent consent, the fourth
amendment prohibited an "administrative" search of residential
premises without a warrant."' The Court rejected, however, appellant's argument that such a search must be predicated on probable
cause to believe that a violation of health and safety regulations
existed. In reaching its conclusion that a more general probable
cause showing was sufficient, the Court balanced "the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails.""17 In a comCHI. L. REv. 47, 49 (1974). Because of this absence of settled doctrine, this section will

compare Justice Stevens's jurisprudence with that of the other current members of the Court.
"I See generally J. LANDYNsKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 (1966)
(describing three possible interpretations of the relationship between the two clauses).
"I2See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504 (1978) (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 327 (1978) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
"I See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (majority opinion); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 3033 (1925). A variety of situations in which a search warrant is not required, justified by
necessity or exigent circumstances, have been delineated. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950).
"I Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
Its
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
" Id. at 534, overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See generally LaFave, Administrative Searchesand the Fourth Amendment: The Camaraand See Cases, 1967
SUP. CT. REV. 1.

" 387 U.S. at 536-37. The factors considered by the Court in its balancing process
included: "[Tihe long history of judicial and public acceptance" of such programs, the
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panion case to Camara,See v. Seattle,"I the Court decided that the
warrant requirement imposed in Camaraalso applied to regulatory
inspections of commercial premises."' In order to reconcile its conclusion in See with the administrative searches required to enforce
the myriad federal, state, and local health and safety regulations,2 0
the Burger Court majority is willing to lower the standard of probable cause for issuing "administrative warrants," but not to allow
21
warrantless searches.

The second significant development was the Court's holding in
Warden v. Hayden 22 that the fourth amendment does not exempt
"mere evidence" from the scope of a valid search and seizure.23
Prior to Hayden, warrants authorized searches for and seizures of
evidence directly related to a crime-instruments and fruits of the
4
crime-but not for private papers or other documentary evidence.
By permitting seizure of the latter, Hayden subjected a far broader
class of individuals to the invasions of privacy incident to a criminal
investigation. The result has been a need for the Court to reassess
the probable cause requirement for warrants to search for mere
evidence. 2s
In response to the problems engendered by these doctrinal developments, Justice Stevens has adopted a position that deviates
sharply from that of the majority. Whereas the Court collapses the
probable cause and reasonableness requirements into a single deterpublic interest in abating or preventing dangerous conditions, and the limited extent of the
invasion of the individual's privacy. Id. at 537.
"s 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
"' Id. at 545.
i After Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), state and local enforcement of state and local

regulations came under fourth amendment scrutiny. Moreover, the federal government's own
regulatory programs have grown immensely in the last generation. See See v. Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 543-44 (1967).
2 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
'
',

387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Id. at 301.

I See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886). The government's interest in the goods seized was, at least at the threshold, a
property interest. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 303-04. See N. LAssoN, TH HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FouRTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNrrED STATES CONsTrTUTION 108 (1937) ("the property
which may be searched for and seized must be such that the government or other claimant
is entitled to its possession, or to which the defendant is not entitled"). In Hayden, however,
this view of the governmental interest was characterized as a "fiction." 387 U.S. at 306. The
true governmental interest was to enforce the law, including regulations under the police
power. Id. at 307. The citizen's interest was not self-protection from prosecution, but privacy.
Id. at 304-06. See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
125 See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307 ("Thus in the case of 'mere evidence,' probable cause
must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular
apprehension or conviction.").
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mination,"5 Justice Stevens views the two clauses as imposing distinct standards. 27 He has argued, partly on the basis of an historical
analysis of the grievances that gave rise to the fourth amendment, 12S
that the search warrant should not be viewed as merely a protective
device for the citizen; "it also grants the government increased authority to invade the citizen's privacy."'' 2 Because of the intrusive
nature of warranted searches, the Justice insists they must only be
permitted when justified by a particularized finding of probable
cause:' 31 the simple fact that a search is reasonable without such a
finding does not justify the issuance of a warrant. Under Justice
Stevens's approach, the reasonableness requirement assumes
primary importance. The warrant clause simply requires that, if
issued, a warrant be based upon a particularized, rather than a
3
general, showing of probable cause.' '
A.

Reasonable Searches and the Warrant Requirement

Justice Stevens's most complete statement of his fourth
amendment jurisprudence is his dissent in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 32 a case involving the constitutionality of warrantless searches
pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).133
" This collapse is the result of the majority's view, on the one hand, that reasonableness
in most situations requires that the search be conducted pursuant to a warrant, and, on the
other, that the validity of a warrant depends upon the reasonableness of the search. See, e.g.,
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). Both the validity of the search and the validity of
the warrant come to rest upon the same determination: "In determining whether a particular
inspection is reasonable-and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant for that inspection-the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these
reasonable goals of code enforcement." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
I" Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The
Fourth Amendment contains two separate Clauses, each flatly prohibiting a category of
governmental conduct.").
In For the Justice's historical analysis, see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 57778 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 327-28 (1978)

(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens has relied heavily on T. TAYLOR, Two STuDms IN
CONsTrrurIONAL INTERPRrAT ON (1969), for his analysis of the original purpose of the warrant

clause. For a somewhat different view see Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69-70 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I" Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 513 n.2 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring).
' See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 513-14 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 328 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"I Justice Stevens has adopted the position that the warrant clause does not imply a
general preference for warrants. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 327-28. This does not
mean that a warrant is never required; to be reasonable, a search may have to be conducted
pursuant to a valid warrant. Id. at 328.
132436 U.S. 307, 328 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976). This
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The case is typical of the distinctive fourth amendment problems
raised by the enforcement of health and safety regulations after
Camaraand See. The majority, relying on Camara,held that OSHA
inspectors do not have the right to enter and inspect the premises
of nonconsenting employers without a search warrant.' 34 The Court
rejected the contention that OSHA inspections fall within one of the
"recognized exceptions" to the warrant requirement. 35 But lest this
ruling make the Act unenforceable, the Court also held that the
probable cause required to obtain the warrant was merely the showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards"'3' were
followed in undertaking the search, rather than specific evidence
that a violation existed. 3 ' Such a warrant requirement, according
to the majority, would still "provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan con3
taining specific neutral criteria.' 1
Justice Stevens advanced two separate theories in dissent. He
noted that the fourth amendment has two distinct clauses and focused on the first: "[Tihe ultimate question is whether the category of warrantless searches authorized by the statute is
'unreasonable' within the meaning of the first Clause."'' 9 Contrary
to the majority, Justice Stevens concluded that regulatory OSHA
inspections fall within the category of searches that, although not
meeting the probable cause requirements of the warrant clause, are
"reasonable" searches. The Justice's second argument, derived
from his understanding of the intent of the framers of the fourth
amendment, 40 was that warrants issued on less than a showing of
particularized probable cause are inconsistent with the principles
underlying the amendment.
Justice Stevens offered several arguments for the reasonablesection of the Act authorizes warrantless inspections of business premises.
" 436 U.S. at 325.
135Id. at 313-14 (distinguishing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) and Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)). The Court noted that OSHA
inspections, unlike those in Biswell and Colonnade, do not apply solely to industries which,
because of a "history of government oversight," have "no reasonable expectation of privacy."
436 U.S. at 313.
13 436 U.S. at 320 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
" 436 U.S. at 320-22. See generally LaFave, supra note 115.
"' 436 U.S. at 323 (footnote omitted).
,3, Id. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140 Justice Stevens quoted J. LANDYNSKI, supranote 111, at 19, and T. TAYLOR, supra note
128, at 41, to support his assertion that the framers were primarily concerned with the
dangers of the general warrant, not with the threat of warrantless searches.'436 U.S. at 32728.
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ness of OSHA's warrantless inspections. First, he said, the Court
should defer to Congress's determination that warrantless searches
were essential to the enforcement of OSHA's safety regulations.' 4 '
Second, the Justice argued that the majority's requirement of an
administrative warrant supported only by a general showing of conformity with the statutory scheme, although adding a burden to the
government's enforcement task, offered little or no protection
against arbitrary searches. Rather, the majority's "new-fangled
inspection warrant," he said, is "essentially a formality" since the
inspector need neither have nor show any cause to believe that
violations of OSHA exist in an employer's plant.4 2 Third, Justice
Stevens asserted that Barlow's was indistinguishable from other
business searches falling within the category excepted from the warrant requirement.14 In his view, businesses subject to the provisions
of OSHA, like those subject to liquor or firearms regulation, "are
required to be aware of and comply with regulations governing their
business activities."'' Justice Stevens's final argument reflected his
conclusion that the work areas subject to inspection in Barlow's
were in no sense confidential and that the privacy interest of the
employer was simply not of the same magnitude as that tradition45
ally protected by the amendment.
Justice Stevens's second line of reasoning was framed as a criticism of the majority's "warrant preference."'' Arguing that the
Framers intended the warrant clause of the fourth amendment as a
procedural safeguard against the evils of the general warrant, Justice Stevens concluded that any warrant issued on less than particularized probable cause is contrary to the purpose of the amendment.
The Justice, unlike the majority, recognized that the scope of gov436 U.S. at 330-31 & n.6.
1

Id. at 337.

'
In United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the Court upheld warrantless
searches of firearm dealers under the Gun Control Act of 1968. The Court deferred to the
judgment of Congress that the public interest required such searches in spite of the invasion
of the privacy of the businesses involved. Id. at 317. On a somewhat different rationale, the
Court held in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), that Congress's
broad, longstanding power to regulate liquor justified warrantless searches.
£4 436 U.S. at 338.
'
Id. Justice Stevens distinguished Camara and See on this basis. Camara, he argued,
was different because it involved a residence, which is entitled to the highest degree of
privacy; See did involve commerical premises, but the inspection in that case involved locked
premises and a statute authorizing far broader search powers than the OSHA provisions at
issue in Barlow's. Id. n.9. Moreover, he argued, Biswell and Colonnade were evidence that
"the doctrine of stare decisis does not compel the Court to extend [Camara and See] to
govern today's holding." Id.
"' Id. at 328. Justice Stevens was reiterating a criticism of administrative warrants
expressed by Justice Frankfurter in Frank and Justice Clark in Camara.
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ernmental intrusions now restricted by the amendment far exceeds
those within the purview of the amendment at the time of its ratification. Thus, Justice Stevens concluded:
[W]e should not dilute the requirements of the Warrant
Clause in an effort to force every kind of governmental intrusion which satisfies the Fourth Amendment definition of a
"search" into a judicially developed, warrant-preference
scheme.
Fidelity to the original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the Warrant Clause has no application to routine, regulatory inspec14 7
tions of commercial premises.
Notwithstanding the sharply divergent views of the majority
opinion and Justice Stevens's dissent, in one sense both sides of the
debate in Barlow's agreed that the question whether a warrant is
required for a given search depends upon reasonableness-specifically a weighing of the public interest against the private interest protected by the fourth amendment. Both majority
and dissent agreed that certain administrative searches are justified
even without particularized probable cause to search. Under its
reasonableness standard, the majority would permit lowering the
probable cause showing for the issuance of a warrant, but would
require warrants for their protecting and validating features. Justice
Stevens would not allow a warrant to issue absent probable cause,
but would allow warrantless searches if other safeguards are present.
The peculiar facts of Barlow's somewhat undercut the
force of the differences between Justice Stevens and the majority. The case arose through the refusal of respondent to admit an
OSHA inspector without a warrant. 4 ' The inspector did not attempt
to enter the premises without some court sanction. Indeed, OSHA
regulations provided that if an employer refused entry, the inspector should report to his area director, who would proceed, if necessary, by obtaining a court order to admit.'4 9 That procedure was
followed in Barlow's. The OSHA regulations thus arguably provided
procedural protections far superior to those required by the Court's
construction of the warrant clause. Yet the Secretary of Labor specifically declined to rely on these regulations to defend OSHA's
search authority, and the Court expressed no opinion whether they
would satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment.15 0
W,Id. at 328.
I"Id. at 310 (majority opinion).
" 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1978). See 436 U.S. at 317 n.12.
436 U.S. at 325 n.23.
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Thus, when Justice Stevens argued that the majority's administrative warrant "adds little to the protections already afforded by
the statute and pertinent regulations," 5 ' he failed to answer the
issue addressed by the majority. Assuming that the majority, like
Justice Stevens, would consider the regulations in force adequately
protective of fourth amendment rights, there remains little practical
difference between them. The only realistic difference is that employers who know that they have the right to demand a warrant may
be less likely to cooperate with the unpopular OSHA inspectors than
those who are led to believe that OSHA has a right to entry without
warrant. Fear of widespread noncooperation may have been the
principal motivating factor in the OSHA litigation strategy and the
52
opinion of Justice Stevens.'
Although there may be few practical differences between the
two views in this case, there are two advantages to Justice Stevens's
approach. First, it does not "dilute" the probable cause requirement. As he argued in his dissent, the fourth amendment's limitation on warrants was specifically designed to prevent the abuse of
the general warrant.'53 If courts begin to adjust the probable cause
standard according to their views of the needs of the case, its value
in cases where it is genuinely applicable may be eroded.'54 Second,
the reasonableness requirement gives the courts great flexibility to
accord practical procedural protections to persons who are the objects of searches. Administrative warrant proceedings are ex parte,
and thus are limited to ensuring that the given search comports with
the general legislative or administrative searching plan. They may
be costly to the agency, but useless to the citizen. The purposes
served by the inspection warrant-"to inform the employer that the
inspection is authorized by the statute, to advise him of the lawful
limits of the inspection, and to assure him that the person demanding entry is an authorized inspector"' 5 5-can be satisfied just as well
or better by other procedural protections imposed under a reasonableness requirement.'
Id. at 332 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
m See id. at 330.
IS See note 140 supra.
ISI

"' See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969). See also White, The Fourth
Amendment as a Way of Talking about People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup.
CT. REv. 165, 176-84 (discussing the policy of particularity and its apparent abandonment in
Camara).
"' 436 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' A scheme like the OSHA regulations might govern the time, manner, or extent of the
search, as well as the notice given to the object of the search. It might also provide for a
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The question inherent in Justice Stevens's approach in
Barlow's is how to devise a standard for distinguishing between
those searches that require a warrant in order to be reasonable and
those that do not. The Justice's brief concurring opinion in
Michigan v. Tyler 157 illustrates, in a different context, his approach
to this problem of defining the relative roles of the reasonableness
and warrant clauses. Tyler involved a series of inspections at the
scene of a fire that officials suspected had been deliberately set. The
majority held that a warrant to search the premises was unnecessary
so long as the search was more or less a part of the fire-fighting itself,
but that an "administrative warrant"'58 would be required for reentry once the exigent circumstances 9 were removed. Once the authorities come to believe that some wrongdoing has taken place, the
Court said, their search for evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution is subject to the usual requirement of proof of probable cause.
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that a warrantless
search was reasonable during the exigent circumstances because of
"a special enforcement need."' 10 Departing from the majority, however, he said that a subsequent reentry should be governed by a
reasonableness standard rather than by the Court's standard for
administrative warrants. Rather than issue an administrative warrant based on less than particularized probable cause, Justice Stevens would instead impose the requirement that the fire authorities
give fair notice of the impending search. While Justice Stevens
agreed with the majority that a search of fire-damaged premises to
determine the cause of a fire is a reasonable exercise of state power,
he argued that, absent "probable cause to believe a crime has been
committed," issuing a warrant for the search would both violate the
"requirements of the Warrant Clause" and sanction a search with
intrusive qualities totally unjustified by the law enforcement need
supporting it.''
The need for some procedural protections can be met, in his
procedure to challenge the search before it is undertaken, if there is no need for an immediate
or surprise search. See also LaFave, supra note 115, at 32-33 (procedure for prior challenge
has long been part of civil administrative search procedure in England).
157 436 U.S. 499, 512 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
I" See id. at 506 n.5 (majority opinion).
UI The judgment that exigencies justify a warrantless entry is made under the reasonableness clause. See id. at 509-10. The majority held, id. at 510-11, and Justice Stevens agreed,
id. at 513 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring), that the exigent circumstances extended beyond the
actual firefighting to a search at the time of the fire and to a reentry several hours later when
daylight returned.
ISOId. at 513 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"I Id. at 513-14.
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analysis, by holding that the search is unreasonable unless accompanied by notice of the inspection. Treating the problem as one of
reasonableness rather than warrantlessness enabled Justice Stevens
to replace the ritualistic requirement of an ex parte warrant hearing
with a genuine protection of privacy in the form of notice. Such an
approach avoids the "abrupt and peremptory confrontation between sovereign and citizen" that results when the state, under the
authority of a warrant, may make a forced and unannounced
entry.16 2 The majority's position in Tyler illustrates the danger,
which Justice Stevens noted in Barlow's, that a reduced probable
cause requirement for administrative searches may result in intrusive searches unjustified either by probable cause to suspect illegals3
ity or by exigent circumstances or "pressing" enforcement needs.
B.

The Requirement of Probable Cause: Third-Party Searches

Both Justice Stevens and the majority set stricter standards for
a lawful search when that search is conducted pursuant to a criminal investigation. The majority approaches probable cause with a
sliding scale: as the evidence of crime grows, an "administrative
warrant" may no longer be sufficient and a search may be conducted only after a showing of particularized probable cause. 64 For
Justice Stevens, too, "reasonableness" will generally not justify a
65
a
particular search pursuant to a criminal investigation "-here
is
needed.
It
warrant based on a high standard of probable cause
might thus appear that the two sides disagree only about the manner of controlling administrative searches. Yet, a bifurcated reading
of the fourth amendment-normally insigificant in analyzing
searches pursuant to criminal investigation-is meaningful for
searches for ordinary evidence (not fruits or instrumentalities of
crime or contraband) in the possession of an innocent third party.
Justice Stevens's dissent in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily'66 exemplifies
the importance of the Justice's theory of the fourth amendment to
cases involving searches for "mere evidence."
In Stanford Daily, five Justices upheld the validity of a search
warrant directed at The Stanford Daily, a student newspaper, to
obtain photographic evidence of a violent demonstration that had
taken place on the Stanford University campus.'67 Earlier editions
I,? Id. (footnote omitted).
I" Id. at 514 n.4.

1' See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978).
I's Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 326.
19,436 U.S. 547, 577 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Justice White, writing for the Court, was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
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of The Daily had indicated that the paper might possess such evidence. The case has attracted great attention because of the first
amendment questions raised by police or judicial intrusion into
journalistic source materials. Like the majority in the case, however,
Justice Stevens concentrated on the fourth amendment aspects,
treating the newspaper in the same way as he would any other
innocent third-party object of a search.
The majority rejected lower court decisions that held the search
of an innocent person's files unconstitutional absent a showing that
a subpoena duces tecum would not have been honored. The Court
labelled these decisions a "sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment" and noted that there was no federal precedent for any distinction between culpable and innocent objects of search warrants.168 If anything, earlier cases"6 9 indicated that more protection
would be given to the person suspected of a crime. Since "probable
cause" for a search warrant and "probable cause" for an arrest are
two different things, the innocence of The Daily was ultimately
immaterial.
Justice Stevens disagreed. He argued that third-party evidentiary searches present serious issues of intrusion into privacy-issues that are not present in other searches and were not
considered by the framers of the amendment-that require careful
analysis of the appropriate probable cause requirement. 170 The consequences to the searched party are great: the searcher may gain
access to information that would not be obtained if the search were
challengeable in advance, the searcher may gain access to unrelated
private material, and the occurrence of the sudden search may
blacken the search victim's reputation.17 ' Unlike searches for fruits
or instrumentalities of crime and contraband, where the probable
cause to believe the subject of the search possesses the sought-after
objects suggests participation in criminal activity and consequently
would support the need for sudden and unannounced search, the
third-party search for mere evidence cannot be so justified. 72 Since
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Powell (who also filed a concurring opinion, id. at 568).
"' Id. at 554 & n.4 (majority opinion).
"' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360, 365 (1959).
'7 436 U.S. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that the problem
in Stanford Daily resulted from the "profound change in Fourth Amendment law" wrought
by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 436 U.S. at 577.
M'436 U.S. at 578-80.

Justice Stevens argued that "[miere possession of documentary evidence" does not
7
persuasively demonstrate "that the custodian is guilty of any wrongdoing or that he will not
honor a subpoena or informal request to produce [the evidence]." Id. at 581. Moreover, the
Justice argued that seizure of such evidence would constitute a constitutional deprivation of
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"[t]he only conceivable justification for an unannounced search of
an innocent citizen is the fear that, if notice were given, he would
conceal or destroy the object of the search, ' '7 3 Justice Stevens would
not permit the issuance of a warrant unless the warrant application
' 74
"demonstrates the need for an unannounced search by force.'
Certain language in Justice Stevens's dissent in the Stanford
Daily case seems to confuse the doctrinal basis for his earlier conclusions that the lack of particularized probable cause in administrative warrants renders them unconstitutional. In Barlow's and Tyler,
he had distinguished between the reasonableness of a search procedure and the probable cause for a belief that evidence (or a violation) would actually be found in a particular location. Here there
was clearly probable cause in this limited sense, but issuance of a
warrant was not reasonable since there was insufficient reason to
think that an innocent third-party would refuse to produce the evidence in response to a subpoena and would destroy it instead.
Justice Stevens appeared to base that conclusion on the very
reasoning he rejected in Barlow's: that the validity of a warrant
ultimately rests upon its reasonableness. "[I]f nothing said under
oath in the warrant application demonstrates the need for an unannounced search by force, the probable cause requirement is not
satisfied." 17 5 This language can be read to imply that the probable
cause requirement is a requirement that a magistrate be satisfied
of the search's reasonableness. In fact, he adopted a formulation of
the reasonableness requirement that precisely parallels that understanding of probable cause: "[Tihe standard of reasonableness
embodied in the fourth amendment demands that the degree of
justification match the degree of intrusion."'' 6 Such reasoning appears inconsistent with the Justice's insistence upon particularized
probable cause in the administrative warrant cases even though
that particularized finding is not essential to the search's reasonableness. But his language does not imply that the reasonableness
requirement is exclusive; rather, in making the determination to
issue a warrant, the magistrate must demand both a demonstration
of probable cause to believe that the evidence will be found and that
the contemplated intrusion is justified by the law enforcement need
liberty entitling the citizen to either "[niotice and an opportunity to object" or "strict
compliance [by the law enforcement officials] with the Fourth Amendment." Neither requirement was met, according to Justice Stevens, by the search in question. Id. at 581-82.
' Id. at 581.
', Id. at 583.
175
Id.

1"'
Id. at 578 (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69 (Stewart, J., concurring in
the judgment)).
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it is intended to serve. In the usual search case, probable cause will
satisfy both requirements, but in the case of evidentiary searches of
innocent third-parties, additional protection is required. This proreasonableness in a bifurtection is provided by the requirement of1 77
cated analysis of the fourth amendment.

As a practical matter, Justice Stevens's presumption that
third-parties will not destroy evidence may be incorrect. As the
majority in Stanford Daily pointed out, search warrants are often
employed early in the investigation, at a time when the guilty cannot be distinguished from the innocent: "The seemingly blameless
third party

. . .

may not be innocent at all; and if he is, he may

nevertheless be so related to or sympathetic with the culpable that
he cannot be relied upon to retain and preserve the articles that may
implicate his friends.

' 178

Moreover, as may be the case with newspa-

pers, the innocent third party may view his relationship to the police
as adversarial. 17 These incentives not to cooperate would be, at
best, difficult to prove in a probable cause hearing. In effect, the
citizen's good will would be the only real guarantee that the investigation not be frustrated. 8 '
Justice Stevens's presumption is not irrebuttable, however. A
probable cause hearing, he might respond, is the place to rebut it.
Law enforcement goals, moreover, cannot always be fulfilled in a
manner consistent with fourth amendment protections. The amendment is, fundamentally, a choice to prefer individual privacy over
completely effective law enforcement.' A dragnet search of citizens
frequenting high crime areas is clearly unconstitutional, 2 although
it may result in the discovery of contraband or the apprehension of
fugitives. The decision was made to permit warranted searches only
when the need for the search can be demonstrated to a neutral
magistrate. Despite the possibility that it may prevent completely
effective law enforcement, Justice Stevens's position seems consisI??

See generally Weinreb, supra note 110, at 69-72. Professor Weinreb points out that a

bifurcated fourth amendment analysis would permit courts to distinguish and make allowances for the various "degrees of privacy" invaded by a search warrant. Professor Weinreb's
discussion focused upon searches for "mere evidence," precisely the problem area Justice
Stevens's bifurcated analysis in Stanford Daily is intended to deal with.
"1 436 U.S. at 561 (majority opinion).
01 In Stanford Daily, for example, the respondent newspaper had an announced "policy
of destroying any photographs that might aid prosecution of protestors." Id. at 568-69 n.1
(Powell, J., concurring).
"' As the majority noted, even if the third party acts in good faith, the delay involved
in employing a subpoena duces tecum may enable the real culprit, who may have access to
the property, to take or destroy it. Id. at 561 (majority opinion).
"I See Weinreb, supra note 110, at 47.
1' See generally Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
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tent with that constitutional decision in view of the increased intrusiveness and opportunity for abuse accompanying third-party evidentiary searches and the reduced urgency of searches in that context.
Justice Stevens and the Dilemma of Fourth Amendment
Doctrine
Justice Stevens's fourth amendment opinions represent an attempt to adapt the constitutional language to search and seizure
cases outside the scope of the original intent of the amendment's
framers. It is at once an effort to preserve traditional understanding
of the amendment and to adapt and reformulate its doctrine to new
contexts. By "abandoning" the warrant as the sole determinant of
constitutionally permissible searches, the Justice is in effect saying
that warrants should be confined to the functions they have traditionally served.' With regard to routine administrative inspections
intended to maintain health and safety regulations, he believes the
fourth amendment permits reasonable, though warrantless,
searches. In those cases in which a governmental search is directed
against presumably innocent third parties for ordinary documentary evidence, Justice Stevens would not abandon the warrant, but
would demand a higher than ordinary standard of probable cause.
Justice Stevens has been particularly responsive to the stress
placed on prior fourth amendment doctrine by the full application
of the amendment to noncriminal, administrative searches. 84 Such
searches are difficult to accomodate in a theoretical framework that
protects against searches by emphasizing the necessity for warrants' and demands a particularlized showing of probable cause. 88
In Barlow's, the Court resolved the dilemma by reducing the particularity of justification required to obtain a warrant to search. Justice Stevens's distinctive approach-evaluating administrative
searches under the reasonableness clause of the amendment-recognizes the qualitative difference between such searches
and the governmental intrusions that have historically been the
concern of the fourth amendment. The fundamental purposes of the
amendment-to safeguard citizens against both physical intrusion
C.

1

See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 328 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Prior to Camara the Court had treated civil administrative searches as outside the

scope of full fourth amendment protection. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); text
and notes at notes 114-117 supra.
10 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)

(exceptions to the warrant requirement are rooted in necessity).
I" See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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and "the seizure of one's possessions and their use against
one"1 7 -are distant from the concerns engendered by civil searches
to enforce health and safety regulations. Unlike searches occurring
during a criminal investigation, which have as their object the prosecution of a citizen for a crime, administrative searches are generally not intended to be part of the criminal process; at least the
justification offered in support of such searches is rarely enforcement of the criminal law.
It is arguable that in civil administrative searches the primary
function of the fourth amendment is protection against physical
intrusion."' 8 The concern with subsequent use of the evidence
seized-one concern that justifies a strict application of the warrant
requirement-may be absent. To the extent that protection of privacy is in fact the primary interest served by the fourth amendment
in the context of administrative searches, Justice Stevens's approach provides a theoretically cleaner method of protecting this
interest than that employed by the majority."9 The analysis of such
searches is clearly distinguished from that of criminal investigatory
searches. The judicially authorized warrant is preserved as a prohibition of general criminalsearches. That role is emphasized by analyzing any search justified by a generalized need under the first
clause of the amendment, thus avoiding both a bifurcated conception of the function of warrants in fourth amendment theory and
some of the difficulties of distinguishing between searches that reI" White, supra note 154, at 213. See also Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Trials 1030
(1765). But see Barrett, PersonalRights, PropertyRights, and the FourthAmendment, 1960
Sup. CT. Rav. 46; Comment, State Health Inspections and "Unreasonable Search": The
Frank Exclusion of Civil Searches, 44 MINN. L. Rav. 513 (1960).
In See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). Of course, when fines
or other penalties may be imposed for regulatory violations discovered in the course of an
administrative search, the citizen's interest has a self-protective as well as a privacy component. It may be difficult to justify differing treatment for administrative searches when they
may lead to the imposition of penalties. The problem may be ameliorated by affording the
citizen an opportunity to comply with the civil regulations before penalties are imposed. In
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the Court confronted a similar problem of identifying
the point at which an adminstrative search for the cause of a fire becomes a criminal investigation, necessitating a warrant based upon particularized probable cause.
I" Justice Stevens does not necessarily approve of administrative searches; he appears
instead to be willing to defer to Congress. "While one may question the wisdom of pervasive
governmental oversight of industrial life, I decline to question Congress' judgment that the
inspection power is a necessary enforcement device in achieving the goals of a valid exercise
of regulatory power." 436 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). It is difficult to believe, however, that Justice Stevens would accord the same deference to Congress's
decision to conduct warrantless searches in other contexts. When an investigation uncovers
sufficient evidence of a particular criminal violation, the investigator would be required to
obtain an ordinary probable cause warrant to continue his inquiry.
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quire warrants and those that do not.
Justice Stevens's approach is generally sensible. His careful
distinction between the two clauses of the fourth amendment and
his reliance on the historical motivation for the amendment' 0 leads
him to a jurisprudence that is more adaptable to the various circumstances in which the modem state confronts the privacy of the citizen. His willingness to give content to the reasonableness standard
beyond the often formal requirement of a warrant offers hope for
more practical protection of individuals in situations not conforming to the traditional search warrant paradigm. His insistence on
preserving the particularized character of the probable cause determination may prevent erosion of that protection against warrant
abuse. Although Justice Stevens has written few opinions in this
area, and none for the majority, in his dissents and brief concurrence may be found the basis for a principled and workable fourth
amendment approach.
IV.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

The procedural due process analysis developed by the Burger
Court, described as a "protected-interest" analysis,' 9 ' is designed to
achieve a sensible accommodation of the individual's rights and the
government's power to act. It involves two separate inquiries.'92
First, the court must determine whether the interest affected by the
particular governmental activity complained of falls "within the
contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of the fourteenth
amendment."'5 3 This determination depends upon the nature of the
interest at stake, rather than its weight.9 4 Second, if the interest
invaded is protected by the fourteenth amendment, the court must
I"Although Justice Stevens's historical analysis appears to be in accord with at least
one fourth amendment scholar, see T. TAYLOR, supra note 128, the historical evidence does
not unambiguously support his entire fourth amendment theory. For example, Professor
Landynski, whom Stevens cites in support of his assertion that protection against general
warrants was the "principal stimulus" for the amendment, 436 U.S. at 327, concludes on the
basis of his historical analysis that treating the reasonableness clause as an independent
justification for a search is inconsistent with the intended meaning of the amendment. J.
LANDYNSKI, supra note 111, at 43. Justice Stevens also fails to take note of the confusion
surrounding the adoption of the final language of the amendment. See N. LAssoN, supra note
124, at 100-03.
"' The term derives from the Court's statement that the right to a hearing is paramount
when "protected interests are implicated." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,569 (1972).
,,2 In this respect, the Burger Court's approach to procedural due process is in marked
contrast to that employed by the Court prior to 1970. Under the earlier due process analysis,
a one-step process was applied to determine the requirements of procedural due process. See
L. TImB, supra note 12, § 10-8, at 507.
,, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
i Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
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determine whether the procedures that accompanied the invasion
are sufficient to withstand constitutional scrutiny. This inquiry requires assessment of the "weights of the particular interests involved."'' 5 Both stages of the protected interest analysis require
close attention to the facts of the cases and precise identification of
the real interests implicated.
Justice Stevens generally has adhered to this doctrinal framework, but certain of his opinions reflect variations in emphasis on
the elements of the due process inquiry. He has departed from his
fellow Justices regarding the scope of protected interests and both
the degree of process required and the time at which such process
is due.
A.

Due Process and Capital Punishment: Justice Stevens's
Protected Interest Analysis

Justice Stevens's use of the balancing required by the second
stage of the protected-interest analysis is demonstrated by his majority opinion in Gardner v. Florida,"' upholding the petitioner's
due process challenge to a sentence of death. The petitioner had
been convicted of first-degree murder by a Florida jury. The jury
had found that mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating
circumstances and recommended a life sentence. The judge nevertheless imposed the death penalty, stating that his decision was
partly based on undisclosed information contained in a presentence
investigation report. Neither the petitioner nor the state requested
to see the report, and the judge failed to offer them an opportunity
to examine it. Petitioner thus had not responded to or challenged
the information relied on by the judge.
Justice Stevens weighed each of four interests asserted by the
state in using confidential investigatory reports for sentencing. 97
"IId. at 570. The second-stage inquiry involves three factors: the private interest affected by the challenged governmental action, the value of the procedures employed and
proposed, and the government's interest in the challenged practices. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See generally Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search
of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CI. L. REv. 28 (1976).
' 430 U.S. 349 (1977). Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Stewart and Powell.
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment, and Justices White and Blackmun wrote
separate concurring opinions. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist dissented, each
writing a separate opinion.
I" Justice Stevens first concluded that the case was not controlled by a prior Supreme.
Court decision. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), upheld a captial sentence predicated partly on a confidential presentence investigation report. Justice Stevens distinguished
the case on two grounds. First, in Williams, the judge had read the important sections of the
report to the parties, who thus had an opportunity to challenge false or misleading informa-

The Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens

1978]

First, the state claimed that assurance of confidentiality of presentence reports was essential to enable the state to obtain the information from sources who might not want their opinions made public.'90
Justice Stevens recognized that a confidential report might provide
"the judge with a better basis for his sentencing decision."", But the
Justice considered this interest outweighed by the danger that "the
information accepted in confidence may be erroneous, or may be
misinterpreted. ' ' 20 He determined that the system cannot risk tipping the scales in favor of the death penalty through unchallenged,
hence possibly unreliable, information.
Second, the state suggested that full disclosure of presentence
reports would unduly delay sentencing proceedings. 21' Justice Stevens found that the risk of delay was overstated since such reports
are presumably accurate and judges can avoid delay by simply
ignoring disputed material. More importantly, he reasoned that
ascertaining the truth of disputed material critical to the question
of life or death would be worth the time spent.
Third, the state claimed that full disclosure would impede rehabilitation of the defendant because such reports often include
psychiatric and psychological evaluations. 12 Justice Stevens responded that this argument did not justify withholding the information from defense counsel, pointing out that rehabilitation is irrelevant to a defendant facing execution.2 3 Although this response may
not entirely dispose of the state's argument in the case in which the
defendant is exposed to the information, either by his attorney or
in court, and is later sentenced to prison, Justice Stevens seems
correct in finding this state interest outweighed by the interest of
the defendant facing possible execution.
Finally, the state reasoned that the discretion of trial judges
should be trusted even when they base their decisions on secret
information. 24 Justice Stevens found this argument to be foreclosed
by decisions subjecting the capital sentencing process to close appellate review to guarantee rationality and consistency. 2 5 He emtion. Second, at the time Williams was decided the Court had recognized no significant
constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments, and had not
decided that sentencing procedures are governed by the due process clause.
430 U.S. at 358-59.
"' Id. at 359.
20

Id.

201Id.
212Id.

at 360.

Id.
204Id.
2U

2" Id. at 360 n.11. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding Florida's capital
punishment statute subject to strict procedures, including meaningful appellate review).
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phasized the value of adversary participation of counsel in the process of evaluating evidence and the necessity of a record for the
constitutionally mandated appellate review. Accordingly, Justice
Stevens found that the asserted state interests failed to outweigh
petitioner's interest in life and, therefore, that the petitioner had
been denied due process of law. The sentence was vacated and the
case remanded.
In Gardner, Justice Stevens attempted to dispel the confusion
concerning the death penalty by employing the procedural due process clause, rather than the eighth amendment, to govern the procedures for its imposition. Prior to Gardner,the Court had adjudged
challenges to both the substance and the procedure of capital punishment under the rubric of the eighth amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments." 6 The eighth amendment can,
however, quite plausibly be limited to protection against certain
types of punishment: against the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.121 7 The language of the fourteenth amendment, on the
other hand, directly concerns process, and thus should be read to
govern the adequacy of procedures surrounding capital punishment."' There is, moreover, no convincing reason to continue to
adhere to the eighth amendment framework when procedure is the
only question. Under the due process clause, the Court is free to
examine the adequacy of the procedures under all the relevant circumstances. Eighth amendment analysis, on the other hand, is directed to four basic hallmarks of "cruel and unusual punishment":
unusual severity, probability of arbitrariness, rejection by contem2
porary society, and penal purpose. 1
Justice White, concurring in Gardner,20 objected to the em2 This may perhaps be attributable to the fact that Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), the leading death penalty precedent, was decided under a grant of certiorari directed
to the "cruel and unusual punishments" issue. Subsequently, in Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976), the Court applied the eighth amendment in a detailed examination of
the procedures for invoking the death penalty, even though the legality of the penalty was
not seriously in doubt, having been established in the companion case of Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976). Use of the eighth amendment to govern sentencing procedure has been
justified by interpreting the language prohibiting "unusual" punishments to mean punishment "wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 310 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
2" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97

(1976).
20 Even Justice Douglas, whose Furman concurrence is largely devoted to showing that
the eighth amendment provides procedural guarantees against discriminatory treatment,
seemed to admit that this argument could rest as well on the fourteenth amendment. See
408 U.S. at 241, 249, 255, 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
2" See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
"1 430 U.S. at 362 (White, J., concurring).
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ployment of the fourteenth amendment as a procedural standard,
apparently fearing that a holding based on the fourteenth amendment might not be confinable to capital punishment cases. But the
Court has construed the due process clause in a flexible manner: the
process required prior to the infliction of so extreme a punishment
as death is not necessarily required in noncapital cases."' Justice
White's concern, therefore, seems unfounded, even if it is presumed
undesirable to apply the due process clause to noncapital sentencing
procedures.
By adopting a procedural due process analysis, Justice Stevens
blunted the arguments of the dissenting Justices to his left and
right. Justice Marshall took the position that the death penalty
itself should be abolished because of the fundamental inadequacy
of the procedures. 12 Justice Stevens's position, in contrast, enabled
the Court to direct its attention to the flaws in the procedure without invalidating the form of punishment. Justice Rehnquist argued
that since the "Eighth Amendment relates to the character of the
punishment, and not to the process by which it is imposed," there
was no constitutional flaw in the capital sentence.213 Under the procedural due process analysis, it is more difficult to argue that the
Court has no right to scrutinize the process employed by the sentencing court.
On its face, Gardner may have been an easy decision. 214 The
M "[Niot all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
2' 430 U.S. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall has consistently held that
the death penalty is unconstitutional in all circumstances. Id.; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). In Gardnerhe argued that the inadequate review given the case by the Florida
Supreme Court undermined the rationale for upholding Florida's death penalty. 430 U.S. at
365.
213 430 U.S. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist apparently believed the
plurality opinion to be based on the eighth amendment, as was Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976). His discussion of due process was limited to the remark that the sentencing procedures in question were "never previously held unfair under the Due Process Clause."
430 U.S. at 371.
214It seems probable that Justice Stevens was less concerned with the procedural flaw
upon which he based his decision than with certain troubling facts in the case. The importance to the petitioner of access to the presentence report may have been exaggerated: his
counsel made no request at the time of sentencing to examine the full report or to be informed
of its contents. 430 U.S. at 353. Either the attorney considered the report inconsequential, or
his failure to request access was an unethical attempt to provoke error.
Justice Stevens may have been motivated by facts in the record that strongly indicated
that there existed the mitigating circumstances of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
and incapacity to appreciate the criminality of the deed or to conform conduct to the requirements of the law. As Justice Marshall pointed out, the petitioner had been drinking virtually
the entire day and night before the killing. After murdering his wife with a blunt instrument,
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trial court imposed the death penalty in utter disregard of the jury's
recommendation of mercy and failed to set forth the reasons for the
sentencing in the record. Justice Stevens's determination that such
an apparently capricious result could not stand is not surprising.
The Justice's use of the due process analysis in Gardner is, however, illustrative of his adherence to the "protected interest" framework. Although the case involved a particularly egregious deprivation, Justice Stevens nevertheless carefully considered each separate state justification for the procedure; in doing so, he achieved a
proper result while preserving the Court's future flexibility to judge
other death penalty procedures on their own merits.
B.

Restriction of the Scope of Procedural Due Process

Although Justice Stevens, in Gardner,demonstrated a willingness to employ procedural due process analysis expansively, he has
also apparently been sensitive to the possibility that the flexibility
of the analysis might result in unacceptable judicial involvement in
the intricacies of governmental processes. Not only might such involvement intrude upon the appropriate power of other governmental units, it might also mire the federal courts in trivialities to the
detriment of their more important functions. 2 5 In a series of opinions, the Justice has sought to limit the procedural effect of the due
process clause by narrow interpretations at both stages of
"protected interest" analysis: in some cases he has cut back on the
breadth of interests protected, in others he has narrowly construed
the type of process required.
1. ProtectedInterests. Bishop v. Wood 216 is a prime example
of Justice Stevens's narrow construction of the scope of "protected
interests." Bishop concerned a North Carolina policeman who was
discharged without a hearing. The city ordinance defining the policeman's tenure provided that he could be discharged if he failed
to perform work up to the standard of his classification, or if he were
negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties. 21 7 The district
court somehow interpreted this to mean that the policeman "held
petitioner slept with the dead body, and appeared not to realize she was dead the next
morning. Id. at 369. Justice Stevens may have preferred to balance the procedural interests
rather than to overturn the trial judge's odd factual determination that there were no mitigating circumstances.
215

This prospect has, on several occasions, caused the Court to constrict the scope of the

procedural due process guarantee. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976);
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
216 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
211 Id.

at 344.
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his position at the will and pleasure of the city. ' 21s The Fourth
Circuit, en banc, split evenly on the issue.219 Justice Stevens, writing
for a five-Justice majority, 220 held that there was no deprivation of
property or liberty, and hence no need to question the adequacy of
the process.
Justice Stevens admitted that although the ordinance, on its
face, might fairly be read as guaranteeing petitioner continued employment, 22' it might also be construed as granting no such right,
but merely conditioning dismissal on the city's observance of specified police department procedures. Since the Justice found both
readings plausible, and since the state courts had not construed the
city ordinance, he deferred to the judgment of the district court,
which he found "tenable," and held that the ordinance did not
constitute a property entitlement. 222 With respect to petitioner's
purported liberty interest, the Justice reasoned that there would be
no serious effect on petitioner's future employment prospects because the reasons for the discharge were kept confidential. Even if
the asserted reasons for the discharge were false, Justice Stevens
2
declined to find petitioner's liberty invaded. 21
The stated reasons for Justice Stevens's conclusions in Bishop
are easily faulted. The district court's interpretation of North Carolina law, on which the Justice relied, seems contrary to the language
of the statute. Interpretation of state law by a federal court seems
an inappropriate occasion for such deference. Moreover, Justice Stevens's argument that the confidentiality of the reasons for discharge
protects the discharged policeman's future employment prospects is
unrealistic in the world of police job-hunting, where prior employment experience is routinely investigated by prospective employers.2 4
Similar to Bishop is Justice Stevens's dissent in Codd v.
Velger.2 2 A New York City police officer had been discharged, after
an apparent suicide attempt, without a statement of reasons or a
hearing. The majority, although willing to assume that the officer
213Id. at 345.
21, See id. at 343 n.3.
21 Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and by Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Rehnquist.
'12 426 U.S. at 345.

2

Id. at 345-47.

Id. at 349.
See id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
429 U.S. 624, 631 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens's opinion is a dissent
rather than a concurrence because, although agreeing with the majority that no liberty interest was invaded, he would have remanded the case on the claim of property deprivation.
2m
12,
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was "stigmatized" by the dismissal, rejected the claim on the
ground that the officer failed to allege that the reasons for dismissal
were false. 22 61 Justice Stevens, however, argued that stigma had not
been proved. He noted that the record was unclear about the precise
nature of the adverse information in the officer's file. Even though
the record showed that a subsequent employer fired the officer after
seeing the information in the file, Justice Stevens did not reject the
district court's dubious determination that the officer had failed to
227
satisfy his burden of proving stigma on the basis of the dismissal.
The Justice's position would place the potential plaintiff in a
difficult position. In order to prove, as a matter of law, that employers would uniformly refuse to hire him, a discharged employee
would have to suffer a lengthy period of unsuccessful job searching.228 Moreover, if, as Justice Stevens said in Codd, the requirement
of fair procedure is unrelated to the merits of the particular case, it
seems inconsistent to require that the discharged employee prove
injury before his right to a hearing is vindicated. As in Bishop,
Justice Stevens gave deference to the lower court judgment in spite
of its implausibility, thereby restricting the scope of due process
intervention in the personnel decisions of local governments.
2. Adequacy of Process. Justice Stevens's dissent in Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft,229 which focused on the adequacy of the process rather than the existence of a protected interest, suggests a more relaxed due process scrutiny of routine governmental actions. Petitioner Memphis Light, a public utility, was
sued in connection with the termination of respondents' utility service. Respondents, customers of the utility, had been receiving two
separate bills for the service. Believing that they were being billed
n' Id. at 627 (per curiam). Technically, it was unnecessary for the majority to reach the
question whether the officer was "stigmatized" by his dismissal, because the case was
disposed of on other grounds. Justice Stevens disputed the Court's novel theory that proper
procedures need not be followed unless the plaintiff can allege-and possibly unless he can
prove-that he was substantively wronged. He reasoned that "it is essential that fair procedure be followed for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of the individual case."
Id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
m "On this record, it cannot be said as a matter of law that prospective employers would
reject respondent's attempts to explain this incident and would uniformly refuse to hire him."
Id. at 638-39.
2
This seems to be a retreat from Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971),
in which the Court said, "[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is
at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be
heard are essential." Either Justice Stevens took an excessively deferential position toward
the findings of the district court, or he must have intended to soften the effect of cases such
as Constantineau.
- 436 U.S. 1, 22 (1978) (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissent-
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twice for the same utility use, and unable to obtain a fully satisfactory response to their complaints,2so respondents paid only one bill.
As a result, their service was terminated four times during the duration of their dispute with the utility. It was finally determined that
respondents were not being "double-billed"; rather, the two bills
covered different portions of their home, a converted duplex.23 A
majority of the Court found that the termination of services was a
deprivation of property without due process. 2
Justice Stevens accepted the majority's conclusion that there
had been a deprivation of property, but denied that the utility's
procedures offended due process.2 Examining the facts of the case,
the Justice found that the respondents had been given timely notice
of the termination and an opportunity to challenge it. Memphis
Light had a policy of sending any customer a timely notice advising
him that he must pay his bill by a certain date or face cut-off of
services. The notice also requested the customer to contact the
Credit and Collections Department if he had difficulty in paying the
bill. In prominent figures, the notice listed a phone number where
Memphis Light employees could be reached who would then direct
customers to other officials authorized to resolve conflicts on a more
permanent basis. Justice Stevens concluded from the facts of the
case that the respondents met with responsible Memphis Light officials, but were unable to convince the officials that there had been
2
a billing error. u
On a more general level, Justice Stevens discounted the majority's concern with health and safety consequences of the termination
policy and found the procedures adequate protection for the customer's interest. The large numbers of terminations per month
without customer complaints of danger to health, the utility's policy
not to disrupt service when there is an illness in the home, and the
ease with which a customer could avoid termination by paying his
bill under protest convinced Justice Stevens that the termination
procedures in use did not seriously threaten health or safety. 5 The
Justice rejected the majority's reasoning that the termination notice
- There appears to have been a factual dispute between Justice Stevens and the major-

ity about what sort of hearing respondents received. The majority concluded that Mrs. Craft's
complaint was dealt with by an employee of "uncertain authority," "apparently without
explanation or attempt at investigation." Id. at 16 n.19. Justice Stevens concluded from the
record that "Mrs. Craft did meet with Division employees having adequate authority but
simply failed to persuade any of them that there was any error in her bills." Id. at 24-25.
"I Id. at 24 n.5.
212Id. at 22.
U3

Id.

2"

Id. at 25.
Id. at 28-29.

2m
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must include a description of methods available to protest a bill as
resting "on a paternalistic predicate that I cannot accept."' 6 Such
information, he said, is necessary only in the "most unusual situations" 2 7 because the ordinary homeowner is capable of lodging a
complaint on his own initiative, without an elaborate description of
procedures.
The Justice also found that customers were adequately protected by available post-termination judicial remedies. He disputed
the majority's contention that the sums of money involved were too
small to justify bringing a lawsuit: if the loss was serious enough to
be a constitutional deprivation, it could "hardly be too petty to
justify invoking the aid of counsel or the judiciary. ' ' 218 More important, Justice Stevens reasoned, is the deterrent effect of potential
damage actions, which "provides far more significant protection
against an unjustified termination" than would the niceties of procedure and the vague requirement of "some kind of hearing" upon
which the majority relied. 39
Justice Stevens's disagreement with the majority focused upon
the weight to be given the individuals' interests implicated in the
case. The majority was concerned with the risk that the available
procedures might endanger customer health and safety; Justice Stevens responded that there was no realistic safety threat. The majority worried about the inability of the customer to understand or
discover the procedures for challenging a bill; Justice Stevens emphasized that the respondents managed to obtain a hearing on their
unusual complaint, and that the ordinary citizen is and must be
capable of showing such initiative.
Although Justice Stevens criticized the majority for trivializing
the notion of due process by its decision in Memphis Light,240 it is
arguable that the Justice has set the threshold of due process protection too high. When the government provides essential services and
induces significant reliance on the continued provision of those services, due process demands that they not be terminated unless the
individual has a realistic opportunity to vindicate his rights. Justice
Stevens concluded that the opportunity in Memphis Light was in
fact a realistic one. This conclusion was not the result of a balancing
of the individual's interest against that of the state, but was based
on the Justice's own conviction that "a homeowner surely need not
"

Id. at 26.

"Id.

Id. at 28-29.
"'

Id. at 29.

24SId. at 27.
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be told how to complain" about his utility bill. 241 The Justice's
reliance on his perception of the capabilities of the ordinary citizen
and the initiative such a citizen must be able to bring in enforcing
his rights, as well as his assertion of the adequacy of common-law
remedies, disregards the difficulties that may be faced by the poor
or uneducated in opposing arbitrary or mistaken government action. 2 2 A postdeprivation judicial remedy will not necessarily deter
mistaken government action that might be prevented by a prior
hearing, especially when that action results from bureaucratic care24 3
lessness.
Memphis Light exemplifies Justice Stevens's more general reluctance to extend the procedural due process protections to government impact on ordinary life situations. Realizing that federal judicial remedies cannot be provided for every injustice in society,244 he
has concluded that the courts should concentrate their resources on
cases of greater magnitude. As he said in Bishop: "The federal court
is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of
personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies. '245 In
Memphis Light he remarked that judges have the ability to appraise
"the fairness of legal remedies and judicial proceedings," but no
comparable ability "to balance the cost of scheduling thousands of
billing conferences against the benefit of providing additional protection. 214 6 Justice Stevens's approach is that of a realist: "We must
accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day administration of our affairs. The United
States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to require federal
2 4
judicial review for every such error. 1
The Justice's willingness to tolerate the transgressions
"inevitable" in the day-to-day operation of the government finds
support in the view that when the government acts in a manner
having an effect on a broad cross section of citizens, the nature of
its political relationship to the populace will guarantee due process.
"I Id. at 26. Indeed, Justice Stevens implied that even the telephone number and address
of the utility printed on the termination notice, while "helpful" to the customer, would not
be mandated by due process. Id.
2,2 See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 10-19, at 561. See generally Michelman, The Supreme
Court and LitigationAccess Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights (pt. I), 1973 DUKE L.J.
1153, 1175.
13 Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 10-18, at 557 (postdeprivation hearing "can never recreate the primary encounter with the decisionmaker that the individual might reasonably
seek").
436 U.S. at 25 n.7.
426 U.S. at 349.
244 436 U.S. at 30.
24,
2

247 Bishop

v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976).
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The notion goes beyond the somewhat dubious argument that the
threat of judicial remedies provides an adequate check on arbitrary
government action. Where the government's role as provider of services or employer affects several strata of society, the more pervasive
political deterrent on government behavior may justify a lower level
of judicial involvement.
C.

Expansive Due Process Protection for Deprivations of Liberty
Justice Stevens's sometimes narrow view of due process protections is also explicable in terms of the nature of the individual
interest at stake. The Justice's dissent in Ingraham v. Wright,24 in
which he argued that the eighth and fourteenth amendments protect school children from arbitrarily inflicted corporal punishment, 249 acknowledged that certain types of government invasion of

individual interests can be vindicated adequately by postdeprivation state remedies and thus require no predeprivation procedural
safeguards. In cases involving defamation or invasions of property
interests, the Justice emphasized, "a postdeprivation state remedy
may be all the process that the Fourteenth Amendment requires."' 0
When such an invasion occurs, "there is a greater likelihood that a
damages award will make a person completely whole than when an
invasion of the individual's interest in freedom from bodily restraint
and punishment has occurred. 251 When an individual's liberty interest is implicated, however, Justice Stevens adopts a markedly
different approach. In Ingraham he joined Justice White's dissent,
which found a postdeprivation damage remedy to be inadequate
248430 U.S. 651, 700 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243Id.
" Id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215 Id. Justice Stevens's greater solicitude for persons facing the loss of their liberty than

for those facing a property loss does not imply, of course, that he always decides in favor of
criminal defendants, or that he believes that due process protection is never required for the
protection of property. See, e.g., Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977) (Stevens, J.)
(rejecting the claim of a state prisoner, on habeas corpus, that his due process rights were
denied by insufficient instructions to the jury); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (finding that Delaware sequestration statute, which permitted stock
in Delaware corporations owned by persons without any contact with the state to be seized
by the state in connection with civil lawsuits in Delaware, denied due process). See also
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), in which the Court struck down a zoning
ordinance having the effect of allowing a grandmother to live with her grandsons if they are
brothers, but not if they are cousins. The plurality, in an opinion written by Justice Powell,
reasoned that the ordinance "deeply intrudes into family associational rights." Id. at 510
(plurality opinion). Justice Stevens, concurring, reasoned instead that the ordinance is not
"a permissible restriction on appellant's right to use her own property as she sees fit." Id. at
513 (Stevens, J., concurring). As the case illustrates, it is sometimes difficult to characterize
a particular right as involving "liberty" or "property."
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process for corporal punishment inflicted by school officials.,,z
When faced witl an alleged invasion of liberty rather than
property, Justice Stevens also applies a different approach to determing wheiiher a deprivation of constitutional magnitude has occurred: the Justice is much more willing to find an invasion of a
protected interest at the first stage of the protected-interest analysis
when liberty is at issue.25 The Justice's more liberal approach to
identifying a liberty interest reflects his distinctive view of its
source. Although he is in agreement with the majority of the Court
that property is based on entitlements created by "an independent
source such as state law"' 1 outside the Constitution, Justice Stevens has sharply disputed the apparent conclusion of a six-Justice
2 55 that a "liberty interest may
majority in Meachum v. Fano
'originate in the Constitution,' or it may have 'its roots in state
law.' ,,u Justice Stevens insisted that liberty is an endowment of
the Creator, and not the product of the Bill of Rights or the laws of
the state: "It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause
protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by
specific laws or regulations." ' 7 He argued that "at the very minimum" the liberty interest includes the "right to be treated with
dignity.""'
How this sweeping language may be applied in various contexts
is not clear.259 In Meachum, a state prisoner challenged the procedures employed in his transfer from a medium- to a maximumsecurity prison. In dissent, Justice Stevens advocated extending due
process protection to prisoners whose status is altered to their
252430 U.S. at 683.
Compare Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) with Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976).
2' Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 n.7 (1976) (Stevens, J.) (quoting Board of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
- 427 U.S. 215 (1976). Justice White wrote the majority opinion.
21 Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 226 (majority opinion)) (citations
omitted).
21 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

2m Id. at 233. Justice Stevens argued that without that dignity, a prisoner would be little
more than a slave.
2' Justice Stevens's theory that citizens have a liberty interest in being treated with

dignity is somewhat circular. The due process clause guarantees that citizens' liberty may
not be infringed arbitrarily. It is not particularly helpful to conclude that the right not to be
treated arbitrarily is itself a right which may not be infringed arbitrarily. But see L. TRm,

supra note 12, §§ 10-7 to -12 (suggesting that procedural due process has an intrinsic value
to the individual apart from ensuring nonarbitrary deprivations of other rights); Van Alstyne,
Cracks in 'The New Property':Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 445, 483 (1977) (arguing that there is a liberty interest in freedom from

arbitrary adjudicative procedures); Rubin, Job Security and Due Process:MonitoringAdministrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Cm. L. Rsv. 60 (1976).
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"grievous loss,"2 ' without regard for whether that loss falls within
the traditional rubric of deprivation of liberty. 2 1 In this important
respect he departed from the protected-interest analytical
scheme: 262 he allowed the weight of the prisoner's interest to govern
the determination whether the invasion infringed his liberty. The
Justice thus appears willing to construe the concept of liberty
broadly, at least where human "dignity" is manifestly involved.
Justice Stevens's particular solicitude for deprivations of the
liberties of prisoners-a powerless group uniquely at the mercy of
3
the state-may also be seen in his dissent in Moody v. Daggett.1
In Moody, a federal parolee, imprisoned for two homicides committed while on parole, petitioned the court on habeas corpus for dismissal of a parole-violator warrant-based on those same
crimes-issued and lodged with the federal prison, but not served
on him. The challenged procedures permitted the parole board to
postpone a hearing on the warrant until after Moody
had completed
2 64
his sentence on the newly committed felonies.
The majority2 65-distinguishing Morrisey v. Brewer2 6-held
that Moody had not been denied due process. They reasoned that
his current imprisonment resulted from the felony convictions
rather than the parole revocation warrants and thus that no liberty
interest had been invaded. The Court emphasized that the parole
board would have to hold a hearing before revoking parole, but that
postponing the hearing until after expiration of the intervening sentence would improve evaluation of Moody's "ability . . . to live in
2a 427 U.S. at 235.
2' The majority held that the prisoner's interest in remaining in the same facility was
"too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protections." Id. at 228.
Justice Stevens considered this too narrow a view of the prisoner's liberty interest. Id. at 22935. Cf. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 244 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (prisoner's
transfer not necessarily so "grievous" a loss as to demand due process protection; he nevertheless had a right to trial on the question of whether his first amendment rights were infringed
by the transfer).
"2 See L. TRME, supra note 12, § 10-12, at 532-33. Traditional protected-interest analysis
becomes attenuated in prisoners' rights cases. It is difficult to determine which rights belonging to persons in confinement should be classified as "liberty interests." Perhaps the only
available course for the courts to take is to classify prisoners' rights according to weight rather
than to nature.
429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
2
The effect of delaying a decision on parole revocation was that Moody would not be
released upon completion of the homicide sentences, but would instead be detained awaiting
completion of a parole revocation hearing.
2u The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger, who was joined by six
Justices.
-6 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolee arrested because of parole violation entitled to prompt
hearing to determine whether parole should be revoked).
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society without committing antisocial acts. 287
Justice Stevens focused his analysis on the timing of the parole
revocation hearing. He argued that the only interest the board had
in delaying a hearing was to allow consideration of the parolee's
behavior in prison. He further argued that a revocation hearing is
not a proper forum for assessing a prisoner's fitness for release from
a current imprisonment.2 18 On the other side of the scale, Justice
Stevens identified reasons an inmate might have for wanting a
prompt hearing: delay may result in the loss of the "fair opportunity
to present facts in mitigation and to challenge the government's
assertions" guaranteed by the Constitution; 6 ' the existence of the
detainer may affect the conditions and extent of custody; the uncertainty of his status may have a negative psychological effect on the
inmate and reduce incentives for rehabilitation. Given the lack of a
legitimate state interest in delaying the hearing, Justice Stevens
concluded that the prisoner's interests necessitated a prompt
hearing.
Justice Stevens did not acknowledge that since the petitioner
was caught and convicted of two homicides while on parole, an
immediate parole hearing would inevitably have resulted in revocation. Moody's true interest in a prompt hearing was essentially unrelated to the opportunity to present facts in mitigation, or to the
uncertainty of his status: he wanted to serve his sentence resulting
0
from revoked parole simultaneously with his current sentences.2
Moreover, it is far from clear that the uncertainty resulting from the
deferral of a decision to allow the sentences to run concurrently
would not provide salutary behavioral incentive. Justice Stevens's
" 429 U.S. at 80 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). The Court said
that the prediction of the prisoner's future behavior would be "both most relevant and most
accurate" if made after expiration of the intervening sentence. Id.
2" Justice Stevens apparently believed the function of a parole revocation hearing was
limited to ascertaining the facts of any alleged violation of parole conditions or of any mitigating circumstances, and to determining whether those circumstances would justify revocation.
He believed that decisions regarding the wisdom of releasing a prisoner, which the majority
considered a part of the revocation hearing function, to be relevant only to a release hearing.
Id. at 95.
211Id. The constitutional claim springs from the right to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1972). Loss of evidence and dilution of the force of
mitigating circumstances arising from a delay between commission of the parole violation and
the revocation hearing might make the hearing less meaningful. See Moody, 429 U.S. at 95.
However, no claim that evidence would actually be lost or had been lost was made in Moody.
Id. at 88 n.9.
'1 429 U.S. at 80-81. In a footnote, Justice Stevens disputed the majority's conclusion
that a prompt revocation hearing would necessitate concurrent sentences, but called the issue
of no constitutional significance. Id. at 91 n.4.
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rejection of the idea that the board should take prison behavior into
account in a revocation hearing disregarded the responsibility of the
board not only to judge whether a violation of parole has occurred,
but also to determine the proper response to the violation.
The Justice's apparent balancing of interests may have disguised a more general distaste for parole board discretion. Justice
Stevens may have been convinced that indeterminate sentences are
unfair and debilitating, preferring instead that prisoners have fixed
release dates.2' If so, then his objection was to the concept of parole
in general, and Moody v. Daggett should be seen as his attempt to
decrease the power of parole boards. In a broader sense, the Justice
may have concluded that the uncertainty brought about by parole
board discretion is intolerable for a free man and that the liberty
interest in human dignity is infringed by such a system.
Justice Stevens's Unique Approach to Procedural Due Process
While the protected-interest analysis employed by the Burger
Court is potentially expansiver2 2 concerns about federalizing tortD.

law27 3 and avoiding undue interference with government proced-

ural decisions have increasingly led the Court to adopt narrow interpretations of the doctrine. With some exceptions,2 4 the Court has,
during Justice Stevens's tenure, contracted the range of protected
interests,25 the type of impact constituting a deprivation of a protected interest,25 and the extent of the due process requirement
when such a deprivation has occurred.27 With respect to identification of protected interests, the Court has looked to positive lawstate, federal, or constitutional-as the source of both property and
liberty interests; with respect to the process required, the Court has
placed greater weight on the administrative costs to government
and greater reliance on the adequacy of postdeprivation remedies.
These aspects of the Court's due process analysis have been criticized for their failure to "define and protect those substantive and
procedural rights that may not receive their due respect in the polit278
ical process.
Justice Stevens's procedural due process opinions, as a group,
171 Many penologists consider indeterminate sentences, whose length may not be determined for years, unjust and irrational. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 49

(1974). Justice Stevens quoted extensively from prison authorities who oppose the challenged
practice on penological policy grounds. 429 U.S. at 93-95 nn.8 & 9.
V2 See generally Mashaw, supra note 195.
- See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
2' Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
M'Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
"6 Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
2'nIngraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
27

L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 10-14.
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stand in sharp contrast to those of the Court. When compared with
the results reached by the Court, the Justice's opinions initially give
the appearance of ad hoc decisionmaking. He wrote the majority
opinion in Bishop, holding that no protected interest had been invaded, yet he dissented from the Court's similar holding, based on
seemingly identical grounds, in Meachum. On the question whether
due process had been afforded, Justice Stevens reached conclusions
opposite to those of the Court, finding that postdeprivation remedies satisfied the due process requirement in Memphis Light, but
not in Ingraham.
The Justice's opinions can, however, be understood as reflecting a consistent approach to procedural due process. As a first approximation, Justice Stevens's distinction is between invasions of
liberty, which are protected by the full power of the courts, and
invasions of property interests, which may sometimes be vindicated
merely by the individual's initiative or his exertion of common-law
rights. Faced with the recognition of the federal courts' inability to
protect the whole of society against injustice, Justice Stevens has
sought to focus the Court's concern upon certain fundamental liberty interests.21 Where government action affects only particular
individuals or implicates fundamental human concerns, the individual is likely to be particularly vulnerable: in such cases the government may essentially be unaccountable for erroneous decisions
and unfair procedures. But where the government is involved in
normal day-to-day administrative activities affecting large numbers
of individuals, Justice Stevens apparently has concluded that the
possibility of political or legal repercussions from inaccurate or arbitrary government decisionmaking may provide adequate incentives
for the development of fair procedures and sensible entitlement
rules, thus making judicial intervention unnecessary. 20
27 Although the Court has long recognized that due process protects "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,"
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884), Justice Stevens's view of "fundamental
interests" differs from the evolving Burger Court analysis of "protected interests." The Court
has increasingly required a basis in positive state law as the source of a protected liberty
interest. E.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). Justice Stevens's view is not one of
adherence to the early-1970s position that due process protection extends to those cases in
which the government has created an expectation or dependence in the individual. See The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 3, at 95. Rather, the Justice's thinking is closer to
the pre-1970s view that due process must be accorded whenever government action causes a
"grievous" deprivation of liberty or implicates some "core" interest founded on statutory,
constitutional, or common law concepts of fairness. See L. Tams, supra note 12, § 10-8, at
506-08 and cases cited in id. at 508 nn.11,13.
2 This basis for decisionmaking must be contrasted with that employed by the majority
in Meachum. In Meachum, the Court declined to involve the judiciary in decisions "that
traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal
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Although Justice Stevens's opinions in Bishop, Codd, and
Memphis Light may give the appearance of an insensitivity to the
discharged public employee or the terminated utility customer, his
lack of solicitude in these cases is the necessary concomitant to his
concern for the defendant sentenced to death, the prisoner at the
mercy of his parole board or prison authorities, and the school child
faced with a beating. The "lesser" cases must give way so that the
courts may devote their attention to those who most need it. Unfortunately, the categories of rights requiring full judicial protection
are not easily defined. Justice Stevens's initial liberty/property distinction can serve only as a starting point. A decision such as Codd
illustrates that interests ordinarily described as "liberty"-in that
case the interest in reputation-may fall into the Justice's lessprotected category. Justice Stevens's chief failure in his due process
opinions has been in not providing a clear rationale for why particular interests are of greater importance than others. The Justice's
distinctions appear to reflect an emphasis on human dignity as the
quality of liberty that demands the heightened protection of the
courts. The formulation is not very helpful, however. The concept
of dignity is too amorphous and subjective a basis for predictable
decisionmaking. 1 For his scheme to succeed as an effective, but
also fair, means of limiting the reach of procedural due process,
Justice Stevens should articulate a rationale more responsive to the
varied contexts in which due process- claims arise.

V.
A.

EQUAL PROTECTION

Justice Stevens and Two-Tier Analysis

Beyond mandating even-handed treatment of citizens, the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has little specific content. Neither the general language nor the ambiguous history of the provision can serve as a clear guide to interpreting its
limits on governmental action. 28 2 Indeed, the shape of modern equal
protection doctrine did not emerge until the 1950s,2 when the
courts." 427 U.S. at 225. Justice Stevens's analysis allowed him to reach different conclusions
in Meachum and Bishop, yet adhere to a consistent concept of due process. The majority's
rationale in Meachum demands that both cases be decided the same way.
21 The abuse of human dignity hardly seems unique to deprivation of liberty. The humiliation associated with an unjustified dismissal from employment or a denial of an essential
service such as electricity may also demean the dignity of the individual affected.
212 Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 5 (1976).
2 Although originally interpreted to apply only to racially discriminatory laws, see The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873), the equal protection clause was later
expanded to govern some economic and social legislation. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
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Court began employing the provision vigorously for the purpose of
eradicating gross disparities in the treatment of persons on the
basis of race and other criteria. In an attempt to accommodate the
egalitarian demands of the fourteenth amendment with the nation's
fundamental commitment to majority rule through elected representatives, the Court devised an analytical scheme that has become
known as the "two-tier" approach. 8 4
Under two-tier analysis, the court first determines the level of
scrutiny to be applied, then considers the validity of the classification under that standard. If the statutory classification involves
economic or social regulation, the court will defer to legislative judgment: classifications 2 5 based on such judgments will be struck down
as violative of equal protection only if there is no rational connection
between the legislative means and a legitimate state purpose.28
When a classification involves discrimination against a "suspect
class" 287 or impairs the exercise of a "fundamental right," however, deference to legislative judgment is considered unwarranted.
Instead the court will engage in "strict scrutiny":25 it will uphold
the legislation only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. The most serious defect in this analysis is that it
535 (1942). Although by its terms the clause applies only to states, the Court, in Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954), applied equal protection limitations to the federal
government through the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Equal protection now
applies to all levels of government and most areas of legislative concern.
21 An excellent judicial summary of the two-tier method is Justice Stewart's concurrence
in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973). See generally
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,supra note 48, at 1076-133.
The equal protection clause independently confers no substantive rights; rather, it
serves to measure the validity of classifications created by legislatures. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
I" In order to survive the rationality test, a statute need only be justifiable in terms of
some legitimate purpose, however tenuous or hypothetical. Most statutes are able to satisfy
this burden. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). See generally Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
217The paradigmatic suspect classification is one based on race. See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Other arguably suspect classifications are those based
on alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); national origin, Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); illegitimacy, Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164, 172-76 (1972); and indigency, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-18 (1956). See
generally L. TmBE, supra note 12, § 16-13.
2" Fundamental interests may include, in some fashion, travel, Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969); voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966); rights inhering in the parent-child relationship, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71
(1968); and privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-86 (1965). See generally L.
TRUBE, supra note 12, §§ 16-7, 16-8, 16-10.
" The Court has used varying terminology. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944) ("the most rigid scrutiny"); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)
("close judicial scrutiny"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) ("strict judicial
scrutiny"). "Strict scrutiny" seems to be the most convenient label for the process.
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eliminates close analysis beyond the initial classification. Once the
level of scrutiny is chosen, the Court's judgment is virtually certain.
Professor Gunther has described this approach as entailing
"scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," or "minimal
2 90
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."
Two-tier analysis has been strongly criticized on the Court,
both as an inaccurate description of the Court's method2' and as an
undesirable approach to equal protection adjudication. 92 Although
the Burger Court has not abandoned two-tier analysis, the Court
has sometimes departed from the strict two-tier approach: in its
short-lived doctrine of the unconstitutionality of conclusive presumptions 293 and, more'importantly, in its use of a "middle-tier" of
scrutiny when important-but not fundamental-rights, or questionable-but not suspect-classes are involved.294 Furthermore, the
25
Court, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
adopted a restrictive standard that seemed to make unlikely the
future recognition of any new suspect classes or fundamental interests.

299

21 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection,86 H~Av. L. RIv. 1, 8 (1972).
21 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the Court "has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause").
292See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 457 (177) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the court
should "repudiate its outdated and intellectually disingenuous 'two-tier' equal protection
analysis"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n. (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("There are
valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the 'two-tier' approach.").
"I In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the Court held that permanent or conclusive
classification violates due process when a classification is "not necessarily or universally true
in fact," id. at 452, and "the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial
determination." Id. The doctrine was apparently abandoned in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749, 767-77 (1975). See Note, Equal Protection:Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court, 53
DEN. L.J. 687, 710-11 & nn.77-84 (1976).
219See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based discrimination); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (gender-based discrimination); James v. Strange, 407 U.S.
128 (1972) (discrimination against indigents); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (discrimination against unmarried persons). Cf. City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976) (municipal rule barring union dues check-off upheld after
examination of rationale); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (deferential stance taken
toward gender-based discrimination).
In general, the Court's approach reflects the application of varying standards of review
for different classifications, dependent upon the invidiousness of the classification. See Note,
supra note 293, at 715-28. This development has been dubbed "newer" equal protection.
Gunther, supra note 290.
215411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court held that wealth is not a suspect classification, and that
education is not a fundamental right.
2" The Court described the "traditional indicia of suspectness" as being "saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
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Justice Stevens has been highly critical of two-tier analysis.
The first indication of his dissatisfaction with the method may be
seen in his dissenting opinion in Mathews v. Lucas.97 In Lucas,
respondent, the illegitimate son of a Social Security beneficiary,
challenged, on equal protection grounds,1 8 several statutory presumptions of dependency that operated to require illegitimate-but
not legitimate-children to prove dependency to receive survivors'
benefits. The majority upheld the classification scheme on the basis
'
Although acknowledging that
of "administrative convenience."299
the presumptions were an imprecise predictor of dependency, the
Court ruled that the classification scheme was permissible so long
as the imprecision "does not exceed the bounds of substantiality
tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny." 30
In his dissent, Justice Stevens appeared to agree that discrimination against illegitimates should not trigger strict scrutiny, at
least in the sense in which that term has usually been employed, 31
although he did note that illegitimate children have been a
"traditionally disfavored class in our society. 3 2 Because traditional
disfavor indicates that the classification may be the result of
"[h]abit, rather than analysis," he noted, the Court "should be
majoritarian political process." Id. at 28. Since adopting this test, the Court has not found a
new classification suspect, although the opportunity has presented itself. See, e.g., Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1976) (illegitimates a specially disfavored class, but no finding
of suspectness); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976)
(aged persons not a suspect class).
The Court limited the class of fundamental interests to rights "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." 411 U.S. at 33-34. The dissent, in contrast, argued that
fundamentality of interests is to be judged on the basis of the "intimate relationship between
a particular personal interest and specific constitutional guarantees." Id. at 115. (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Since Rodriguez, the Court has apparently adopted a less vigilant approach
to at least one of the interests formerly viewed as fundamental. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 404-09 (1975) (right to travel). See also Salyer Lake Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 726-30 (1973) (arguably applying less scrutiny in a case involving
the right to vote).
427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
" Equal protection claims against action by the federal government arise under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); see
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). Although the Court has stated
that equal protection analysis is the same under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, see
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), "the two
protections are not always coextensive." Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
Actions impermissible under the fourteenth amendment may be justified when taken by the
federal government to serve "overriding national interests." Id.
"1 427 U.S. at 509.
3 Id.
"' "[This] result should not be accepted without.
. . something more than a 'possibly
rational' basis." Id. at 519-20. The normal strict scrutiny requires more than a possibly
rational basis. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,supra note 48, at
1087-133.
3 427 U.S. at 520.
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especially vigilant in examining any classification which involves
illegitimacy."3"3 The Justice argued that although the status of illegitimates may not justify invoking "strict scrutiny," it does require
a closer evaluation of the classification than that provided by the
simple rational relationship test. Finding the relationship between
the end and the means "tenuous," and the Court's proposed justifications "nebulous inference upon inference," he concluded that "a
fair evaluation of the competing interests at stake" required striking
down the statute.'" 4
What was implicit in Justice Stevens's dissent in Lucas was
made explicit in his concurrence in Craig v. Boren,15 in which he
expressly abandoned two-tier analysis: "There is only one Equal
Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially. It
does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some
cases and a different standard in other cases."3 ' Justice Stevens
also expressed skepticism about the accuracy of two-tier analysis as
a description of Court practice. Rather than representing two distinct standards of review, he said, it "is a method the Court has
employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard
in a reasonably consistent fashion."3 7 He did not, however, attempt
to articulate that "single standard," but proposed instead to provide "a careful explanation of the reasons motivating" his decision,
in the belief that such explanations in particular cases would contribute more toward identification of the standard than would an
articulation "in all-encompassing terms."' 5
B. The Search for a Single Standard: Three "Explanations"
Craig involved a challenge to an Oklahoma statute setting the
"

Id.

Id. at 521-23. In striking contrast to Lucas is Justice Stevens's opinion for a unanimous
Court in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), which upheld Medicare provisions excluding
certain aliens from benefits. In spite of his usual solicitude for the rights of aliens, see, e.g.,
Foley v. Connelie, 437 U.S. 291, 311 (1978); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102
(1976), Justice Stevens, with slim justification, upheld the provisions in Diaz. Perhaps this
may be explained by his argument that the provisions in Diaz represented discrimination
between classes of aliens rather than between aliens and citizens. 426 U.S. at 80. But this
argument merely sidesteps the fact that an eligibility requirement, which only some aliens
could meet, was imposed on aliens and not on citizens. The only other principled explanation
for Justice Stevens's decision is that the federal government has such extraordinarily broad
powers over aliens that equal protection analysis is misplaced. See Rosberg, The Protection
of Aliens from DiscriminatoryTreatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REv.
275, 282-93.
429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
*1 Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 212.
"'
Id.
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minimum age for purchase of 3.2 percent beer at eighteen for women
and twenty-one for men." 9 Justice Stevens stated the question presented by the case as "whether the traffic safety justification put
forward by the State is sufficient to make [this] otherwise offensive
classification acceptable.310 With respect to the offensiveness of the
classification, Justice Stevens found it to be neither as "obnoxious"
nor as "inoffensive" as the majority and dissent had viewed it. The
Justice gave three reasons for finding the classification
"objectionable": it was based on "an accident of birth," it reflected
an "almost universally rejected" tradition of discrimination against
males of that age, and it exhibited a "perverse" relationship to the
311
physical characteristics of men and women.
Against the offensiveness of the classification, Justice Stevens
balanced the state's purported justification for the statute. He admitted that the classification was not totally irrational, referring to
evidence that more men than women in the eighteen to twenty-one
year old age bracket do in fact both drive and drink, 312 but concluded that the justification was nonetheless inadequate. First, he
found it difficult to believe that the legislature's actual purpose in
enacting the law was to promote highway safety. Rather, he thought
the statute reflected "nothing more than the perpetuation of a stereotyped attitude about the relative maturity of the members of the
two sexes. '3 3 Second, assuming that traffic safety was the legislature's true motive, he doubted that the statute could have its intended effect.3 4 Finally, even "assuming some such slight benefit"
from the classification, Justice Stevens viewed the benefit as insufficient justification for the "insult to all of the young men of the
315
State" that the classification involved.
Further light may be cast upon Justice Stevens's equal protec, Justice Brennan's majority opinion, in which Justice Stevens also joined, struck down
the statute. The Court applied a test stricter than the ordinary rational basis test:
"[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197. The statute did not meet
this test. Earlier cases had rejected .'archaic and overbroad' generalizations" on the basis of
sex, id. at 198, and the factual basis for the classification-more teenage males than females
drink and drive-had not been sufficiently established.
429 U.S. at 213.
" Id. at 212-13.
112Id. at 213.

311Id. at 213 n.5.
'"
Justice Stevens's conclusion was based on empirical data in the record. Id. at 213-14.
Id. at 214. It is not immediately apparent why Justice Stevens concluded that an
"insult" which affected no protected rights was of constitutional dimension. Cf. text and
notes at notes 225-228 supra (inhospitable to claim of "stigma" absent proof of deleterious
consequences).
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tion approach by comparing his opinions in Califano v. Jobst3 M6 and
Zablocki v. Redhail.317 Jobst involved a challenge to provisions of
the Social Security Act that terminated child benefits upon the
marriage of the child to a person not also eligible for benefits. As
respondent's case showed-his wife was also disabled, but not eligible for benefits-these provisions could work great hardship upon a
class of persons without apparent reason. Justice Stevens, writing
for a unanimous Court, upheld the provisions after applying a rationality test. He found distinctions on the basis of marital status
relevant to the determination of dependency.3 18 Moreover, he noted
that the challenged provisions served to ameliorate the harshness of
the former statute, which had terminated benefits upon any marriage. He declined to find the provisions invalid merely because they
3 9
did not completely eliminate the possibility of a harsh result. 1
In Zablocki, respondent challenged a Wisconsin statute that
prohibited residents from marrying without court permission if they
had minor children who were not in custody but were the subject of
a court-ordered support obligation. Justice Stevens, concurring in
the judgment, characterized the statute as determining who might
enter marriage, thus distinguishing it from Jobst, which merely involved an economic impediment to marriage. "The economic aspects of a prospective marriage are unquestionably relevant to almost every individual's marriage decision. But I know of no other
state that denies the individual marriage partners the right to assess
the financial consequences of their decision independently."3 0
While finding the individual's interest more compelling in
Zablocki than in Jobst, he also found the governmental purpose in
Zablocki unpersuasive. The purpose itself was legitimate: to promote counselling of the parents and protection of the out-of-custody
child. But Justice Stevens found the effect of the statute "either
futile or perverse" with respect to at least four major classes of
persons adversely affected by the statute.3 21 He was thus able to find
the statute unconstitutional without joining the majority's conclu32
sion that marriage is a fundamental right. 1
3,6 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (Stevens, J.).

434 U.S. 374, 403 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring).
"1 434 U.S. at 53-54.
3" Id. at 54-58.
434 U.S. at 404 n.4.
'' Id. at 406 (childless couples; couples, if forbidden to marry, whose children would be
illegitimate; couples whose economic status will be improved by marriage; and couples who
are so poor that the marriage will have no impact on the welfare status of their children).
3n Id. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring); see id. at 383-87 (majority opinion).
317
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C.

A Standard for All Cases, or a Standard for Each?

Justice Stevens's assertion in Craigthat the two-tier characterization of equal protection decisionmaking is "a method the Court
has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard" 323 is a plausible one. "Strict" and "minimum" scrutiny can
be regarded not as two exclusive, discrete standards of review, but
rather as extremes on a continuum of possible priorities between
state and individual interests. At the very least, the Court seems to
be moving in this direction. Justice Powell, in his concurrence in
Craig,32 1 for example, while noting that he "would not welcome a
further subdivision of equal protection analysis, "325 recognized the
inadequacy of two-tier analysis to deal with the full range of equal
protection cases. 32 1 Similarly, Justice Marshall in Dandridge v.
Williams 327 advanced an equal protection analysis that may be
termed "sliding scale," an approach that seems close, if not identical, to that employed by Justice Stevens. A middle-tier equal protection analysis, which applies an "intermediate" standard of review, can be identified in a number of the Burger Court's decisions,
primarily in cases concerning classifications deemed not quite
"suspect"-such as gender or alienage-based discrimination-or
individual interests deemed not quite "fundamental"-such as
marital rights.32 8 Professor Gunther, who recognized the trend of
these cases before Justice Stevens joined the Court, 329 has termed
this evolving standard "equal protection bite without strict scrutiny."33
Although Justice Stevens has purposely eschewed labelling
his approach to equal protection, 33 his opinions suggest that it is
essentially one of interest balancing. 32 On one side of the balance
32

429 U.S. at 212.

32

Id. at 210.

* Id. at 210 n*.
u' Justice Powell has been somewhat ambivalent about the proper approach in equal
protection cases. In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), he noted that the
equal protection inquiry is "inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the
classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?" Id. at 172-73. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973), however, he specifically endorsed two-tier analysis. Id. at 17.
- 397 U.S. 471, 520-22, 528-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
- See cases cited at note 294 supra; L. TRIBE, supra note 12, §§ 16-30, 16-31.
See Gunther, supra note 290, at 18-37.
Id. at 12.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
An interest-balancing approach contrasts sharply with two-tier analysis, which, at
least in theory, admits of little balancing. No balancing of state against individual interests
occurs under the rational relationship test; to be valid, the classification need merely serve
some legitimate state interest and not be wholly irrational. Under strict scrutiny, balancing
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lies the individual interest affected by the classification, 3 "3 on the

other side is the state's interest in making the classification. The
more important the interest of the class affected by the classification, the more substantial is the state interest required to justify
it, and the greater the burden on the state to show that it actually
serves that interest. That an interest may be constitutionally protected does not necessitate application of "a 'level of scrutiny' so
strict that a holding of unconstitutionality is virtually foreordained." ' 4 On the other hand, Justice Stevens has insisted that
when such protected interests are implicated, the state must have
more than "a rational expectation of occasional and random benefit.".35

Justice Stevens's balancing approach-essentially a sliding
scale scrutiny that shifts with the relative weights of the individual
and state interests implicated-shares many of the characteristics
identified as comprising "intermediate" review.3 6 The Justice first
makes an assessment of the relationship between the challenged
classification and the class of affected individuals. This inquiry may
focus either on the nature of the classification, as in Lucas and
Craig,337 or on the impact on some interest of the members of the
affected class, as in Jobst and Zablocki 3 1 In addition to obviously
suspect classifications, the Justice is particularly sensitive to legislative distinctions that are drawn on the basis of "accidents of
is only implicit; the relevant inquiry is not into the relative weights of the interests at stake,

but into the nature of the state interest-to see if it is compelling-and into the classification-to see if it is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Although application of twotier analysis inevitably involves some balancing-for example, the weight of the state interest
may affect the closeness of the fit between ends and means required in a strict scrutiny casethe doctrinal framework necessarily limits its use.
This individual interest is not always that of the plaintiff who has been disadvantaged
by the classification: "The broad legislative classification must be judged by reference to
characteristics typical of the affected classes rather than by focusing on selected, atypical
examples." Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 55 (1977).
= Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 406 n.10 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring).
SId.
33
See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, §§ 16-30, 16-31. Professor Tribe identifies five
"techniques" characteristic of intermediate review: assessment of the importance of the
governmental interest, requirement of a "close fit" between legislative ends and means,
requirement of a current articulation of the classification's rationale, limitation of
"afterthought" justifications, and adjustment of the challenged legislative scheme to permit
rebuttal in individual cases. Id. § 16-30. Professor Tribe's description of the first of these
techniques indicates that the Court's use of intermediate review may, at least in some cases,
be indistinguishable from the balancing approach we have attributed to Justice Stevens. Id.
at 1082-83.
Lucas, 427 U.S. at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Craig, 429 U.S. at 213 (Stevens, J.,
31
concurring).
. = Jobst, 434 U.S. at 53-54 (Stevens, J., concurring); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 404 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
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birth" or that result from "habitual"
or "traditional" ways of think339

ing about a class of individuals.
Once he has characterized the challenged classification, the
Justice engages in a multifaceted examination of the state justification for the provision. The weight of the state interest served"by the
statute is an important, but by no means dispositive, factor in the
Justice's analysis. Unlike the rational relationship requirement
under minimum scrutiny, Justice Stevens's balance demands a
stronger showing of rational need for a discriminatory classification.
340
If the relationship between legislative end and means is "tenuous"
or if the effect of the classification is "futile" or "perverse" with
respect to its purported purpose,34" ' then he will vote to strike down
the statute. Moreover, the Justice is unwilling to accept otherwise
legitimate justifications that he concludes did not actually form the
basis of the legislative decision to create the offending classification.311 Justice Stevens's balancing approach is thus a complex process: only after he has satisfied himself with respect to actual legislative purpose will the Justice balance the state's justification
against the interests of the individual.
Justice Stevens's approach responds to two grounds
of criticism of the Court's rigid two-tier analysis. First, it fills
the gap between the poles of strict and minimum scrutiny, a
dichotomy too limited to account for the many variables inherent
in all but the most straightforward equal protection cases. 4 3 The
Justice's adoption of a "single standard," however, does not necessarily represent a total repudiation of the standards of two-tier analysis: his use of balancing is consistent with a continuing sensitivity
to those situations that lie at the opposite extremes of his scale-the
two-tier paradigms. At these extremes, the difference between refusing to participate in explicit balancing and recognizing that balancing yields a preordained result is merely one of semantics. Second,
Justice Stevens's analysis tempers the substantial deference to legislative judgments accorded by minimum scrutiny. The Court's requirement, under two-tier analysis, of only a minimal rational
'4' See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 405 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring); Jobst, 434 U.S. at 53
(Stevens, J.); Craig, 429 U.S. at 213 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring); Lucas, 427 U.S. at 520
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 307-12 (1978) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
Lucas, 427 U.S. at 513-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3, Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 403-06 (Stevens, J., concurring); Craig, 429 U.S. at 212-13
(Stevens, J., concurring).
312See Part VI infra.
3,1 In this respect, of course, Justice Stevens is not alone on the Court, as evidenced by
the Court's recognition of a middle tier of equal protection cases. See notes 328 & 336 supra.
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connection between means and ends in all cases except those involving suspect classes or fundamental rights fails to respond to the
actual irrationality or deceit that may sometimes exist in the legislative process. Justice Stevens, by carefully examining the legitimacy of proposed legislative justifications for discriminatory classifications, has significantly contributed to refining the analysis of
those cases falling within the middle tier-age, gender, and alienage
classifications.
The same aspects of a sliding scale that make it appealing
engender difficulties, however. If two-tier analysis tends to defer too
much to legislative judgments, Justice Stevens's brand of balancing
may err in the other direction.3 44 In his equal protection opinions to
date, Justice Stevens has reached results different from two-tier
analysis only in those cases involving "questionable" classifications,
cases in which other members of the Court have also applied intermediate review. It is conceivable (though not inevitable) that a
balancing approach, coupled with a more searching requirement of
rationality, might open a broader involvement of the courts in reviewing arguably sensitive, or even economic legislative classifications.
A more significant objection to the Justice's equal protection
analysis is that a sliding scale is not a single standard at all, but
rather a technique by which courts formulate separate standards of
review on a case-by-case basis. Such an approach to equal protection decisionmaking does not fulfill the Court's function to define
for legislatures their responsibilities under the Constitution. The
two-tier approach has the virtue of putting legislatures on notice
that certain classifications will not pass constitutional muster;
sliding-scale analysis increases drastically the degree of judicial
subjectivity in equal protection adjudication and gives little guidance to legislatures regarding the bounds of permissible legislation.
Although judicial value choices still inevitably play a role in any
equal protection decision, Justice Stevens's formulation may give
the courts too free a hand to limit the exercise of legislative judg3
Jutice Rehnquist's strongly worded dissent in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)
(involving intestacy provisions regarding illegitimate children), although directed at the intermediate scrutiny applied in Justice Powell's majority opinion, strikes at the heart of
Justice Stevens's equal protection analysis. Justice Rehnquist characterized the Court's general application of the equal protection clause, other than in racial discrimination cases, as
"an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a series of conclusions unsupported by any
central guiding principle." Id. at 777. He disparaged the majority's requirement of a close fit
between legislative purpose and statutory means as "second-guessing of legislative judgment
in an area where this Court has no special expertise whatever." Id. at 783-84. In Justice
Rehnquist's view, there is no "constitutional mandate" for the Court to "instruct" legislatures in the proper techniques of rational decisionmaking. Id. at 784.
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ment or to usurp the broad factfinding and policymaking functions
of the legislatures. 45
VI.

DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING

The judiciary has traditionally been concerned with the results
of lawmaking, not with the lawmaking process itself. For example,
in United States v. O'Brien346 the Court rejected an argument that
a law prohibiting draft card destruction was unconstitutional because Congress, in passing the law, intended to stifle political dissent. The Court declared: "It is a familiar principle of constitutional

law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit motive.1 347 In explaining this
principle, Chief Justice Warren stressed the difficulty of ascertaining the actual legislative motive underlying a statute on the basis
of the statements of a small number of legislators, 348 and the futility

of striking down laws that could be reenacted with a suitably laundered legislative history.3 5 Although O'Brien involved a challenge
based on the alleged contamination of a statute by an improper
motive, the Court's aversion to scrutiny of actual legislative purpose
has also been prominent in determining the rationality of statutes
under two-tier equal protection analysis. 30 In cases neither impinging on fundamental rights nor employing suspect classifications, the
3,1 In what was hailed as the most important equal protection case of the decade, the
Court considered the question whether the University of California could constitutionally
discriminate in favor of members of minority groups in its medical school admissions.
Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978). Justice Stevens wrote an opinion
concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart
and Rehiquist, that did not reach the constitutional issue. Justice Stevens found the University's affirmative action program violative of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1976). Because five justices reached the constitutional question, it may be considered
odd that Justice Stevens did not express his view. This may be explained by his reluctance
to reach constitutional issues unnecessarily-even in dissent-or by the possibility that he
originally drafted the opinion for a majority.
-- 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Warren, C.J.).
3,, Id. at 383. See also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.)
(upholding validity of land grant from Georgia despite allegations that state legislature was
corruptly influenced in passage of enabling act).
31 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("A law
conscripting clerics should not be invalidated because an atheist voted for it.").
3" 391 U.S. at 383-84. Commentators have noted the disutility of invalidating what may
be good law passed for "bad" reasons, see, e.g., Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1215-16 (1970), as well as the impropriety of
such judicial inquiry into the motives of a coordinate branch of government, see, e.g., Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive,
1971 Sup. CT. Rav. 95, 129-30. But see Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 520 n.11 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (reliance on a hypothesized legislative purpose "is not properly
deference to a decision that the legislature could have made but did not.").
-' See generally Part V supra.
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Court has been willing to accept virtually any post hoc justification
offered to demonstrate the rationality of a law, without inquiring
35
into the actual or principal reasons behind its enactment. '
The Court's deferential attitude, expressed in O'Brien and evidenced in minimum-scrutiny equal protection decisions, appears to
be waning, at least in equal protection cases. This phenomenon may
be traced in part to the Burger Court's growing dissatisfaction with
two-tier analysis.3 5 2 In some decisions striking down classifications
' '3
not quite "suspect" or involving rights not quite "fundamental, 11
the Court has formulated a demand that "the challenged distinction
34
rationally further some legitimate, articulated state purpose.1 1
Furthermore, in some cases the Court has examined the source of a
challenged classification, requiring that the decision be made by a
governmental body competent to the task of rational decisionmaking. Judicial concern with the identity of the decisionmaking body
and the process by which it decides reflects a recognition of what
has been termed the right to "due process of lawmaking. ' '1 51 The
doctrine goes beyond the equal protection notion that legislation
must serve some rational purpose: a statute containing a discriminatory classification or implicating liberty or 'property interests
must be enacted by a rationally purposive legislative process. Although the Court has not fully developed or explained 356 the doc-

I"

See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of fact reasonably may be conceived to justify it.")
(emphasis added); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959).
=5 See text and notes at notes 291-296 supra.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648-53 (1975) (gender-based distinction); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-54 (1972) (marital-status distinction). See also
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 511-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally
L. TaIBE, supra note 12, § 16-30, at 1083-88.
"I McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) (emphasis added). The Court in
Royster, however, appeared to equate "articulated" with "argued on appeal." See id. at 27071.
"I The origin of the term has been credited to Professor Linde, Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976), and adopted by Professor Tribe, L. TaIBE, supranote
12, § 17-3, at 1144, Professor Sager, Sager, InsularMajorities Unabated:Warth v. Seldin and
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1411-18 (1978), and
Justice Stevens, Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 98 n.11 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Each of the four has ascribed a different meaning to the term.
Professor Tribe appears to have used the term most expansively, including within the scope
of the due process of lawmaking inquiry "who promulgated the provision, to what ends, and
in what manner." L. TaB., supra note 12, § 17-3, at 1144. Justice Stevens's view is somewhat
more circumscribed.
Although several cases have at least in dicta indicated a need for inquiry into actual
legislative purpose, see notes 353-354 supra, it is arguable that each could have been decided
on rationality or other grounds. Nevertheless, the lack of true purpose seems to have been at
least a contributing factor to the decisions. For an early attempt to clarify the Court's inchoate approach, see Gunther, supra note 290, at 25-37.
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trine, Justice Stevens has been instrumental in its recent emergence. Several opinions by the Justice-in particular, those involving
equal protection analysis357-indicate that he recognizes legislativepurpose 358 analysis as a legitimate judicial function.
A.

The Requirement of Rational Decisionmaking

1. Questionable Classifications: Searching for Legislative
Purpose. The due process of lawmaking theme appears in Justice
Stevens's majority opinion in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.35 Respondents, resident aliens, challenged the constitutionality of federal
civil service regulations limiting most federal employment to United
States citizens. Relying on cases holding that states may not lawfully exclude resident aliens from the practice of law3 10 or from state
employment 6 ' unless such exclusion is based on some legitimate
state interest, respondents asked that the same equal protection
standard be applied against the federal government. Mathews v.
Diaz, 312 decided on the same day as Mow Sun Wong, appeared to
foreclose this argument. In Diaz, a unanimous Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Stevens, refused to apply a strict standard of
scrutiny to federal residency requirements for alien Medicare recipients. The decision was based on the ground that "it is the business
of the political branches of the Federal Government. . . to regulate
the conditions of entry and residence of aliens. 316 3 Nevertheless, in
Mow Sun Wong the Justice found that the employment restriction
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The type of scrutiny Justice Stevens employed was unusual.
Although he described aliens as an "identifiable class of persons
357 This

aspect of Justice Stevens's equal protection analysis was evident even before he

joined the Court. See Special Project, The One Hundred and First Justice:An Analysis of
the Opinions of JusticeJohn Paul Stevens, Sitting as Judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeal,, 29 VAD. L. REv. 125, 136 (1976) ("his position in future decisions is likely to
emphasize a rigorous questioning of legislative purpose" (discussing Cousins v. City Council,
466 F.2d 830, 857-61 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972)).
3 To some extent, "purpose" and "motive" are terms of art; "purpose" is most often
used in equal protection cases to designate the legitimating governmental objective of a
challenged classification. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 (1977). Thus a
purported purpose may be distinguished from the "actual" or "motivating" legislative purpose. See id. The concept of "motive" is generally used in O'Brien-like cases, in which the

inquiry is into actual legislative purpose. Justice Stevens generally uses the term "purpose"
to mean "actual purpose." For a criticism of the failure to distinguish between purpose and

motive, see id. at 782 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"' 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Stevens, J.).
'"In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
31 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).

342 426

U.S. 67 (1976) (Stevens, J.).

m Id. at 84.
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who . . . are already subject to disadvantages not shared by the
remainder of the community, ' 364 the Justice purported to avoid the

equal protection issue of whether the government interest was sufficiently compelling and the provision sufficiently related to that interest.3

5

pect" 36

of the case: he described the exclusion of aliens from govern-

Instead, Justice Stevens focused on the "procedural as-

ment employment as a "deprivation of an interest in liberty.

' 367

Significantly, however, he did not assert that "some type of hearing" was required; as the dissent pointed out, the case involved no
governmental action that required a hearing.3 8 Rather, the procedures in question were those employed in promulgating the regulation itself.
The Civil Service Commission had adopted the challenged regulation with the clear acquiescence, but not at the specific direction,
of Congress and the President 9 Before the Court, the Commission
proposed three justifications for the regulation: (1) it served as a
bargaining chip for the President's negotiation of treaties; (2) it
acted as an incentive for aliens to become naturalized citizens; and
(3) it avoided the administrative inconvenience of identifying those
jobs too sensitive to be filled by aliens.3 70 Justice Stevens rejected

the first two justifications because they exceeded the narrowly circumscribed authority of the Civil Service Commission to make policy decisions concerning foreign affairs. 37 ' He rejected the third proposed justification, although it was arguably rational, because there
was no evidence in the record that "the Commission actually made
any considered evaluation of the relative desirability of a simple
exclusionary rule on the one hand, or the value to the service of
enlarging the pool of eligible employees on the other. 31 72 When the

federal government enacts a discriminatory rule that would violate
3" Id.

at 102.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) would appear to have answered the question.
Diaz's holding that the broad powers of Congress over immigration precluded strict judicial
scrutiny of congressional classifications of aliens would seem to apply in Mow Sun Wong as
well. Oddly, the issue carefully left open in Mow Sun Wong, see 426 U.S. at 117 (Brennan
and Marshall, JJ., concurring), was apparently decided by a unanimous Court the same day
in Diaz. See Rosberg, supra note 304, at 282.
3" 426 U.S. at 103.
3
Id. This determination is questionable. The Court has never expressly held that the
right to federal employment, without more, is a liberty interest protected by the due process
clause. See Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896-99 (1961).
"
426 U.S. at 121 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3' See id. at 105-14 (Stevens, J.) (historical discussion of the role of Congress and the
President in the exclusion of aliens from the federal civil service).
rf Id. at 103-04.
311 Id. at 114-15. See text and notes at notes 408-414 infra.
" Id. at 115.
30
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equal protection if adopted by a state, the government must prove
that the rule was actually intended to serve an "overriding national
'7 3
purpose.
The Justice's concern in Mow Sun Wong with "actual," rather
than hypothetical, legislative purpose appeared again in his concurrence in Califano v. Goldfarb.37 4 In Goldfarb a four-Justice plurality,37 5 joined in the judgment by Justice Stevens, held unconstitutional a section of the Social Security Act providing that survivors'
benefits be automatically paid to widows, but paid to a widower
only upon proof that he had depended on his wife. The plurality
found that the statute discriminated against the female wage
earner, whose surviving spouse was deprived of benefits, and that
the discriminatory classification violated the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due process clause.3 76 The Court
reached this result on the basis of an "'inquiry into the actual
purposes' of the discrimination.3 177 The plurality concluded that
"the differential treatment of nondependent widows and widowers
results not. . . from a deliberate congressional intention to remedy
the arguably greater needs of the former, but rather from an intention to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage earners, coupled
with a presumption that wives are usually dependent. ' 378 The plurality found this presumption insufficient to justify the discriminatory effects of the provision.
Justice Stevens, concurring only in the judgment, focused his
attention upon the treatment of the recipients of benefits, rather
than the wage earners, and decided that a classification treating
37 9
women more favorably than men is not necessarily invidious.
Moreover, he accepted as not "wholly irrational" 30 two hypothetical
justifications for the classification: administrative convenience and
"cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss" upon women.3 81
Like the plurality, the Justice examined the "actual reason" for the
discriminatory statutory scheme. Since the statute authorized payment of $750 million per year to widows who were not actually
dependent on their spouses-hence, not within the broad purpose
31

Id. at 103 (Stevens, J.).

37,

430 U.S. 199 (1977).

311

Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and

Powell.
3'1 See note 298 supra. The plurality relied primarily on Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975).
3
430 U.S. at 212-13.
"I Id. at 216-17.
31 Id. at 217 (Stevens, J., concurring).
3"Id.
at 219.
31 Id. (quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974)).
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of the statute-he concluded that Congress could not rationally
have intended to discriminate in favor of widows for purposes of
administrative convenience. 2 With respect to the suggestion that
Congress intended the discrimination to "compensate [women] for
past wrongs," Justice Stevens found no indication that the challenged provisions were the product of any such conscious purpose. 84
Since the benefits of the provision accrued largely to women least
likely to be victims of past discrimination, he concluded that
"[r]espect for the legislative process precludes the assumption that
the statutory discrimination is the product of such irrational lawmaking.""8 5
Justice Stevens's reasoning drew upon his opinion in Mow Sun
Wong. When a statute employs a "questionable" classification-such as the gender-based distinction at issue in
Goldfar6-" 'due process requires that there be a legitimate basis
for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve [the]
836
interest' put forward by the government as its justification.1
When Justice Stevens measured the challenged provision against
this test, he found it constitutionally impermissible.38 7 He concluded
that Congress had never adverted to the question whether to distinguish surviving spouses on the basis of sex."' Instead, the Justice
declared, "habit, rather than analysis or actual reflection," led Congress to adopt the scheme: "[T]his discrimination is merely the
accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about fe388
males."
Justice Stevens has engaged in this form of analysis, though in
3" The rejection of the administrative convenience justification can be explained on two
grounds: (1) it is irrational to spend such a large amount for benefits when it can be assumed
the cost of making individual determinations would be much smaller or (2) the amount spent
is so large that it can be assumed Congress never considered the administrative convenience
rationale, or else it would have engaged in a cost-comparison analysis, no indications of which
appeared in the legislative history. The former is standard equal protection analysis; the
latter is consistent with the due process of lawmaking doctrine. The Justice's Goldfarb opinion, although not unequivocal, suggests the latter. 430 U.S. at 220.
n Id. at 222. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
" If any doubts existed about the true basis of this portion of the Goldfarb opinion, they
were dispelled in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), where Justice Stevens joined a
per curiam opinion upholding Social Security provisions granting larger old age benefits to
women than men. The legislative history made clear that the scheme was designed to compensate women for past discrimination.
3n

430 U.S. at 221.

430 U.S. at 223 (quoting Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976)).
ul Justice Stevens declined to say that the same statutory scheme would be unconstitutional if reenacted pursuant to a "considered legislative choice." 430 U.S. at 223 n.9.
us Id. at 222.
u' Id. at 222-23.
3u
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less detail, in other equal protection cases. In Craig v. Boren,"' the
Justice examined the proferred justification of a statute discriminating against young men-promotion of traffic safety-and found
the marginal benefits of the statute insufficient to outweigh the
"insult" it imposed on 18-to-20-year-old males."' An integral step
in reaching this result was the Justice's conclusion that the legislature had not intended the statute to serve the ends of traffic
safety. 2 The lack of evidence of a valid legislative purpose led him
to suspect the proposed rationale: "There is, of course, no way of
knowing what actually motivated this discrimination, but I would
not be surprised if it represented nothing more than the perpetuation of a stereotyped attitude about the relative maturity of the
members of the two sexes in this age bracket. '3 3 The significance
of this analysis is not that the Justice found a "traditional way of
thinking" to be an impermissible basis for a discriminatory classification, but rather that he was willing to scrutinize the legislative
3 4
process to determine what had actually motivated the legislature.
2. The Requirement of an Articulated Purpose. In Mow Sun
Wong, Goldfarb, and Craig, Justice Stevens voted to strike down a
statute, admittedly rational in terms of a proposed justification, in
part because he believed that the true motivation for the provision
was impermissible. Moreover, in each case the challenged classification-based on gender in two of the cases and alienage in the
third-was "sufficiently questionable"39 5 that equal protection doc" 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See text and notes at notes 309-315
supra.
"1 429 U.S. at 213-14.
" Id. at 213. The lack of any legislative history on the point and the contrary conclusion
suggested by related statutory provisions convinced the Justice on this issue.

3

Id. at n.5.

"I An equal protection opinion focusing on a "traditional way of thinking," but less

clearly utilizing due process of lawmaking analysis, is Justice Stevens's dissent in Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), see text and notes at notes 297-304 supra. Justice Stevens
concluded the presumption that illegitimate children were not dependent was so tenuous that
a statutory exclusion of such children from survivors' benefits "must either be irrational, or
serve a purpose other than the one by which it is essentially justified." 427 U.S. at 522 n.4.
While the irrationality of the classification would probably be sufficient for the Justice to
strike down the statute on equal protection grounds, Congress's failure to consider the possibility of dependency of illegitimates-"the product of a traditional way of thinking of illegitimates as less deserving," id. at 523-clearly underlay his objection to the provision. See also
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 307 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (search for actual purpose
revealed all justifications adverted to by Congress either irrational or impermissible).
I"Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (Stevens, J.)). Justice Stevens, however,
did not explain how a classification became "sufficiently questionable."
Gender has attracted considerable judicial support for inclusion in the list of "suspect
classifications," see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Brennan, J., for a fourJustice plurality), but a majority of the Court has never so labelled it.
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trine required evidence of legislative intent to serve a legitimate
purpose. Justice Stevens appears, however, to have extended his
motive analysis beyond scrutiny of questionable classifications.
In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 96 appellee
challenged a statute excluding one subgroup of Delaware Indians
from a cash distribution made in compensation for breach of an 1854
treaty. The reason for the exclusion was neither impermissible nor
outmoded; the legislative history indicated that the subgroup was
excluded through mere congressional inadvertence. The majority
determined the proper equal protection standard of review in light
of the broad congressional authority in Indian matters: 97 a classification is valid "'[als long as the special treatment can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation toward
the Indians.'" The majority found, on the basis of three tenuous
hypothetical justifications,398 that Congress's exclusion of alppellees
could rationally be tied to its "unique obligation" and upheld the
statute.
Justice Stevens cast the lone dissenting vote. He disagreed with
the majority's conclusion that the justifications offered were rationally tied to Congress's obligation to Indians. In his view, four factors
demanded that the statute be struck down: the "more than . . .
ordinary" interest the claimants had in equal treatment, 391 the absence of any practical need for discrimination among the Delawares,
4 ' for the discrimination,
the absence of a "principled justification""
and the lack of evidence that the discrimination was a deliberate
choice of Congress.40' The first three factors cited by the Justice
reflect his dispute with the majority on the equal protection issue.
The fourth, however, goes beyond the traditional bounds of equal
430 U.S. 73 (1977).
The congressional authority over the management and distribution of lands and property of the tribes is derived "both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution." Id. at 85
(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974)).
38 The proposed justifications were that the excluded subgroup was not a recognized
tribal entity, that it had been excluded from an earlier distribution, and that it was included
in statutory language designed to exclude a related group for good reason. See 430 U.S. at
85-89. Justice Blackmun strongly criticized each of the justifications, but joined in the decision nevertheless. Id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"' Id.
at 97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that Congress has a "special
responsibility to deal fairly with similarly situated Indians." Id. at 97 n.8.
4' Id. at 97. See note 398 supra.
"I The only hint that the excluded Indians merited special constitutional protection was
Justice Stevens's enigmatic statement that "members of the class whose rights were adjudicated by the Indian Claims Commission have more than an ordinary interest in equal treatment." 430 U.S. at 97. This extraordinary interest, which Justice Stevens did not explain,
seems more a product of congressional responsibility than the characteristics of the group.
See notes 397 & 399 supra.
"
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protection analysis. Unlike Goldfarb and Mow Sun Wong, Delaware
Tribal did not involve an invidious classification."' Nevertheless,
the purposelessness of the distinction moved Justice Stevens to
scrutinize the proposed justifications for the legislation more carefully than did the other members of the Court. Although he expressed his reluctance to "suggest that the constitutionality of legislation should turn on the actual motivation, or lack thereof, of the
legislators who participated in the legislative process,""4 ' the Justice
examined that process and found the lack of any legislative purpose
dispositive. Because he could detect no evidence of "actual legislative choice," he concluded that there had been "a deprivation of
property without. . . 'due process of lawmaking.' "40
Justice Stevens's concentration on process at the legislative
level, which separated him sharply from the rest of the Court in
Delaware Tribal, reveals the unique nature of the due process of
lawmaking inquiry. The majority's equal protection analysis, which
focused on the possibility of invidious discrimination, ignored what
was crucial to Justice Stevens's analysis: the flawed decisionmaking
process itself violated the Constitution. The Justice's insistence, in
Delaware Tribal, on an articulated congressional purpose and his
refusal to accept hypothetical justifications-like his search for actual governmental motive in Mow Sun Wong and Goldfarb-is essentially an equal protection approach. But some of the language in
his opinions is that of procedural due process: he first identifies the
liberty or property interest at stake, then determines the procedures required of the government before an individual may be deprived of that interest."5 Thus, to answer the substantive question
-whether a classification is adequately supported by government
In 430 U.S. at 97. The legislative history plainly showed that Congress was unaware that

a separate subgroup of the Delawares with identical claims existed. See id. at 89 (majority
opinion).

Id. at 97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 98. Justice Stevens borrowed the phrase "due process of lawmaking" from
Linde, supra note 355, but did not follow the reasoning of the article. 430 U.S. at 98 n.11.
Justice Stevens's dissent in Delaware Tribal can be explained as a finding of irrationality, 430 U.S. at 94 ("the lack of any rational explanation for the legislative malfunction");
Justice Blackmun's concurrence made it clear that even under traditional minimum scrutiny
I

the statute was not easy to uphold. See note 398 supra. The importance of the case, however,

is not that Justice Stevens dissented, but in the reasons he assigned for his dissent. He
expressly stated he was "not prepared to say that if Congress had actually reviewed the status
of the Kansas Delawares, it might not have found some principled basis for treating them
differently from other Delawares." Id. at 97.
"I That the concept of procedural due process is usually concerned with individualized
determinations and not with promulgation of general rules was apparently no barrier to its

special use in these cases.
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interests-the Court must first study the legislative process to
determine which government interests were in fact part of the legislative purpose.
The Proper Decisionmaker

B.

The requirement that a discriminatory statute or regulation
result from a conscious and articulated judgment that such a classification serves a legitimate governmental purpose, although accounting for Justice Stevens's scrutiny of the legislative processes
in Goldfarb, Craig,and Delaware Tribal, only partially explains the
Justice's opinion in Mow Sun Wong. Justice Stevens rejected two
of the three rationales proposed by the Civil Service Commission 4' 0-facilitating treaty negotiations and providing an incentive
for aliens to become citizens-not because the Commission was not
motivated by such concerns, but because it could not have been.
Justice Stevens's requirement that there be a "legitimate basis" for
presuming that a governmental enactment was intended to serve a
valid purpose thus takes on a more expansive meaning. Due process,
he concluded, demands not only that the exclusion of aliens from
the civil service further a valid purpose intended by the enacting
body, but that such a regulation be enacted by a body "having
direct responsibility for fostering or protecting" the governmental
interests supposedly served by that policy. 07 Both the interest
served by the classification and the reasons for choosing to serve
that interest through the means chosen must be considered by a
responsible governmental entity.
Justice Stevens was willing to "assume" that had the citizenship requirement been "expressly imposed" by the President or
Congress, the proffered "national interest" justifications might have
sufficed."' But, he concluded, neither Congress nor the President
had ever specifically required the Commission to establish citizenship as a condition of civil service employment. 9 Rather, the Commission had acted independently pursuant to its delegated authority. Although the President, acting under his power delegated by
426 U.S. at 114-15.
Id. See Rosberg, supra note 304, at 279. The regulation struck down was promptly
reissued by the President as an Executive Order, without any statement of reasons, Exec.
Order No. 11,935, 3 C.F.R. 146 (1976), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 3301 (1976), and has been
upheld by the Seventh Circuit on the basis of Mow Sun Wong. Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d
1281 (7th Cir. 1978).
'
426 U.S. at 103, 105.
" Id.
at 105. Justice Stevens conceded that when the Commission was established,
Congress might well have assumed that a citizenship requirement would be applied, but he
concluded that such an assumption "is by no means equivalent to a considered judgment that
it should do so." Id. at 107.
"

'
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Congress, 10 had authorized the Commission "to establish standards
with respect to citizenship . . .which applicants must meet" to
qualify for civil service employment," ' Justice Stevens concluded
' that promotion of the
from the language of the Civil Service Act 12
efficiency of the Service was the only basis upon which the Commission could justify its regulations denying aliens access to civil service
jobs. 3 With regard to the broader policy justifications, the Justice
refused to "presume that the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission . . .was deliberately fostering an interest so far removed

from his normal responsibilities."4 4'
Justice Stevens's conclusion that the Commission's decisionmaking process was beyond the scope of its responsibility is perplexing. As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent-and which Justice
Stevens presumably would not dispute-"Congress, through the
President, obviously gave responsibility [for determining citizenship requirements] to the Civil Service Commission." ' Justice
Stevens, however, apparently relied on a unique variant of the nondelegation doctrine. Where constitutionally protected interests are
affected by the exercise of a delegated power, such a decision must
be made by a governmental body responsible for the policies underlying the decision. Thus, although Congress may delegate certain
functions, its constitutionally mandated policymaking role in certain areas-such as foreign policy-may not be delegated. t 6 Such
'"5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976) provides that the President shall have the power to "prescribe
such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil service in the executive branch

as will best promote the efficiency of that service."
" Exec. Order No. 10,577, 3 C.F.R. 218 (1954).
422 See note 410 supra.
423426 U.S. at 113, 114.

"IId. at 105. The requirement that an administrative agency confine its attention to
matters properly within its jurisdiction is not new. See, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications,

Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953). These cases, however, involve "adjudication," not "legislation"; they
concerned determinations of an individual party's rights rather than promulgation of a general rule. This is arguably an important distinction. See text and notes at notes 428-430 infra.
42 426 U.S. at 125 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"' Apparently, however, Justice Stevens does not mean that all agencies are incapable
of implementing "overriding national interests." "If the agency which promulgates the rule
has direct responsibility for fostering or protecting that [overriding national] interest, it may

reasonably be presumed that the asserted interest was the actual predicate for the rule." Id.
at 103. The question, of course, is how one identifies those national interests that may be

delegated and those agencies or other government bodies to which they may be so delegated.
With respect to the decision to exclude aliens from the civil service, Justice Stevens said:
Since those residents were admitted as a result of decisions made by the Congress and
the President, implemented by the Immigration and Naturalization Service acting
under the Attorney General of the United States, due process requires that the decision
to impose that deprivation of an important liberty be made.
of government.

. .

at a comparable level
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an approach appears strikingly at odds with the accepted concept
of delegation.4" To say that Congress may broadly delegate its powers, but that its delegatees may exercise those powers only on the
basis of narrowly circumscribed reasons would seem to render the
authority of such bodies nugatory when they attempt to promulgate
regulations having a differential impact on various groups.
This aspect of Mow Sun Wong, it would seem, can only be
understood as an attempt by Justice Stevens to ensure that deprivation of protected individual interests in the name of "overriding
national interest"
be the result of a decisionmaking process that is
"reflective" 418 and is made by a body accountable to the people.',
When Congress delegates authority to an agency, the decisionmaking process becomes significantly further removed from one source
of government accountability: the voters. When that agency purports to act on the basis of some essential national policy interest,
as opposed to administrative efficiency, the "political" nature of its
decisions removes it from the reach of the other source of accountability: judicial review.
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,Inc.4"' involved
another variation on the problem of permissible delegation of legislative power. The Court upheld an Eastlake, Ohio, provision that
Id. at 116 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). What is such a "comparable level of government"? Presumably it would not be the Immigration Service, but what of the Attorney
General? Professor Sager's suggestion that such a decision must be made by "a governmental
entity which is so structured and so charged as to make possible a reflective determination
that the action contemplated is fair," Sager, supra note 355, at 1414, is not particularly
helpful. One important distinguishing factor might be the degree of direct oversight of the
agency by either Congress or the President. This would be consistent with the Justice's
apparent concern with the accountability of governmental rulemaking bodies. See text at
note 432 infra. Justice Stevens noted in Mow Sun Wong that under the statute the Commission was free to "retain or modify its citizenship requirement without further authorization
from Congress or the President." 426 U.S. at 113 (footnote omitted).
" Justice Rehnquist's dissent asserted that the majority's approach to delegation would
"dismantle the entire structure of the Executive Branch." 426 U.S. at 124 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). He argued that the "decision to exclude aliens from the civil service is a political
decision reserved to Congress." Id. If Congress has properly delegated this decision to an
agency, according to Justice Rehnquist, the courts may no more review the reasons for the
agency's decision than the reasons underlying a decision made directly by Congress. Id. In
other words, once Congress delegates the authority to make a decision, it delegates the
responsibility to consider all those factors that Congress might take into account in making
such a decision.
"' Sager, supra note 355, at 1414.
"'
See Rosberg, supra note 304, at 280:
On this sensitive matter Congress and the President would not be permitted to hide
behind the Civil Service Commission. On the other hand, if the executive and legislative
branch would . . .[make] their'decision openly and informed by contemporary views
• . .the Court would be much more willing to defer to their judgment.
4- 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
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required approval of zoning variances by a fifty-five percent vote
in a referendum. The majority, citing Justice Black's desciiption
of the referendum as "a classic demonstration of 'devotion to
democracy,' "421 concluded that such a referendum was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative responsibility.41 Although
the Court recognized the possibility of unfair results from such a
system, the majority said that a landowner who suffered an arbitrary disposition of his variance request could vindicate his rights
adequately by seeking administrative relief.4rs
Justice Stevens, dissenting, invoked a "proper decisionmaker"
argument similar to that in his majority opinion in Mow Sun Wong
and found that the referendum procedure violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 42 The Justice quoted extensively from the Ohio Supreme Court's decision striking down the
procedure. The language of the Ohio court is strikingly similar to
the due process of lawmaking terminology Justice Stevens employed
in Mow Sun Wong:
Due process of law requires that procedures for the exercise of
municipal power be structured such that fundamental choices
among competing municipal policies are resolved by a responsible organ of government. . . . [and] that fundamental policy choices underlying the exercise of that power are articulated
4
by some responsible organ of municipal government. 25
Justice Stevens agreed with the Ohio court that a plebiscite was not
a "responsible" decisionmaking body. The referendum provision set
no standards for the voters to use in evaluating the merits of a
landowner's request for a variance. Moreover, the Justice observed,
"most of the voters would be indifferent and uninformed about the
wisdom of building apartments rather than a warehouse. ' 42 6 He
found the majority's assertion that any unfairness in the procedure
could be ameliorated through "administrative relief" to be an inadequate substitute for an initially fair and rational decisionmaking
4
process. 2
"I Id. at 679 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)).
'2 Respondents argued, as the Ohio Supreme Court had held, that the delegation was

impermissible because "the voters were given no standards to guide their decision." 424 U.S.
at 675.
' Id. at 679 n.13.
12 Justice Stevens employed due process analysis because "the opportunity to apply for
an amendment" is a protected property interest. Id. at 682 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'2 Id. at 688 (quoting 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 196, 324 N.E.2d 740, 746 (1975)).
,2 426 U.S. at 694.
' Id. n.16 ("A procedure in one case does not become constitutionally sufficient because
some other procedure might be available in some other case.").
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Justice Stevens further argued that because of the nature of the
decisions being made-determinations of individual property
rights-the referendum procedure was particularly inappropriate:
the general electorate is incapable of collecting the information required to make such determinations of fact and policy on a rational
basis. 4 8 In sum, the Justice stated, "popular vote is not an accepta'
ble method of adjudicating the rights of individual litigants."429
Since the Justice characterized the challenged procedure in
Eastlake as "administrative," the due process protection required
was that of a fair hearing. He made clear, however, that whether the
procedure in Eastlake was characterized as administrative or legislative, the type of dispute submitted to the referendum demanded
that "interested parties be given a reasonable opportunity to have
their dispute resolved on the merits by reference to articulable
rules."4 0

C. The Scope of Due Process of Lawmaking
It is not clear how extensively Justice Stevens would have the
courts delve into the rationality of the lawmaking processes of government. The scrutiny of actual legislative purpose in Goldfarb and
Craig suggests a use of this analysis as an element of equal protec-

tion doctrine. 431 But Justice Stevens's insistence in Delaware Tribal

that a statutory classification is constitutionally suspect if it was an
"accident"-an insistence that led to his dissent in the case-seems
to go much farther. Instead of merely serving to alert the courts to
laws of dubious validity, the due process of lawmaking doctrine as
invoked in Delaware Tribal seems to demand a general rationality
in the decisionmaking process itself. Finally, the Justice's analysis
of delegated lawmaking responsibilities in Mow Sun Wong and
Eastlake suggests an expansive judicial role in determining that
certain bodies-because of lack of interest, information, or expertise-are unlikely to act rationally, and hence are not competent
lawmakers. The two aspects of Justice Stevens's analysis of the
processes of governmental decisionmaking-inquiring into actual
legislative purpose and requiring that certain decisions be made by
412Id. at 693-94.

m Id. at 693.
3 Id. at 692-93.
"I The requirement of a clearly articulated legislative intent in cases involving a depriva-

tion of some protected interest, however, is not novel, see, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
129, 130 (1958), and although the search for "true" governmental purpose is arguably new,
there are at least indications of such a search in some earlier cases. See note 354 supra. See
also L. TamE, supra note 12, § 16-30.
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an appropriate decisionmaker-thus form a general model for judicial review of legislative, administrative, or quasi-judicial enactments. Justice Stevens seems to demand that "laws, unlike naked
commands, be explained to those they touch,"' 3 2 and that lawmaking bodies must be accountable for the decisions they make. That
is, the Justice will not respect political decisions if the decisionmaker has not articulated the reasons for the decision and considered its political consequences.
A strict requirement of rationality in all aspects of the legislative process, however, raises difficult problems for a political system
based upon a concept of representative democracy. There is no reason to presume that democratic decisionmaking can always be
"rational" as demanded by Justice Stevens. Legislators, administrators, and voters may sometimes behave as carefully calculating
policymakers, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of a
given proposal and carefully tailoring the resulting scheme to accomplish the most good with the least cost. Often, however, they
will weigh interest group against interest group, principle against
expediency, and national interests against the desires of their constituencies. 3 3 A wide-ranging judicial scrutiny of legislating processes entails the difficult task of ascertaining the decisionmakers'
subjective thought processes and motives. 4 4 Evaluation of the rationality of legislators, as opposed to scrutiny of the rationality of
the results of legislative decisions, should be the function of the
electorate rather than the courts. 3 5
But Justice Stevens has generally applied the due process of
lawmaking analysis in justifiable circumstances. First, there is a
strong argument for ascertaining "true" legislative purpose as an
adjunct to equal protection scrutiny. While the rationality of individual legislators is properly subject to review by the voters, the
courts should not countenance irrational or arbitrary laws that impinge on significant interests of classes of individuals in need of
42 Tribe, From EnvironmentalFoundationsto ConstitutionalStructures:Learningfrom
Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545, 554 (1975).
4" See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977).
4 Inquiry into the motives of legislators also necessarily involves the subjective notions
and prejudices of the judge, which may affect the judge's assessment of legislative motive.
I' The point is that evaluation of the quality of performance of the task of lawmaking
should be made by the individual(s) from whom the decisionmaking authority derives and
to whom the decisionmaker is accountable. Thus, agencies operating pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress or the President should be evaluated by the source of their respective
delegated powers.
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special protection."' Second, when a decisionmaking body is not
accountable for its decisions, as in Mow Sun Wong, the courts may
justifiably demand evidence of a rational decisionmaking process.
Finally, when a governmental body-whether a legislature, administrative agency, or the electorate by referendum-makes quasijudicial determinations of the particular interests of individuals, as
4 37 judicial deference to the
in Delaware Tribal or Eastlake,
"legislative" process is a less compelling consideration. In one respect, Justice Stevens's use of the due process of lawmaking doctrine reflects a reluctance to usurp the lawmaking function of legislative and administrative bodies. By "remanding" a challenged provision to the responsible decisionmaking body, Justice Stevens acknowledges the proper lawmaking functions of the executive and
legislative branches of government while preserving the right of the
governed to be free from arbitrary or uninformed decisions
and in3
vidious, though arguably justifiable, classifications.1 1

VII.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Justice Stevens's constitutional opinions is their novelty.4 9 The Court's newest member is
often willing to depart sharply from the courses taken by his fellow
Justices and to reformulate judge-made rules of constitutional law
in a manner closer to his perception of the fundamental principles
of the Constitution. Novelty in judicial decisionmaking can be dangerously unsettling in a system that derives its continuity from past
decisions. By its very nature, however, constitutional law, to a far
greater degree than other areas of the law, requires rethinking by
each generation of judges. A mistaken or archaic interpretation of
a statute has ready redress in the legislature; interpretation of the
Constitution has no such institutional safeguard. Moreover, strict
1$1See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,

265 (1977).
4" DelawareTribal,to be sure, involved legislation, but that "the legislative action under
review is the culmination of a quasi-judicial proceeding brought on behalf of the entire class

distinguishes this legislation from policy decisions of general applicability." 430 U.S. at 97
n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The characterization of the Indian Claims Commission as at
least a quasi-adjudicative body seems correct. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v-2 (1976).

43 That the notion of "remand to the legislature" is inherent in the application of the
due process of lawmaking doctrine has been noted elsewhere. L. TamE, supra note 12, § 17-2,
at 1142-43; Sager, supra note 355, at 1417. The procedure has been urged by a number of
commentators in the past. See L. TRmE, supra note 12, § 17-2, at 1143 n.12 (citing authorities).
"I' See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Stevens, J.);
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Stevens, J.).
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application of stare decisis would elevate judicial pronouncements
to the level of constitutional provisions. If the purpose of judicial
interpretation is to enforce the elusive content of the Constitution,
the text itself, not merely the existing judicial gloss on that language, is the proper starting point for the Court's analysis."' When
existing judge-made rules cease to resolve new disputes in a way
consistent with the Constitution, those rules should not be dispositive.4 4'
This conception of the judge's role in constitutional decisionmaking has influenced Justice Stevens's analysis. For example, in
his fourth amendment opinions-Barlow's, Tyler, and Stanford
Daily-the Justice recognized that controlling precedents developed in response to particular circumstances may be inappropriate in other contexts. His rejection of the warrant as the touchstone of "reasonable" searches and seizures in Barlow's was based
not on a belief that the warrant-preference of his colleagues failed
to produce a fair and protective result in that case, but upon a fear
that the majority's distortion of the historical purpose of the amendment would ultimately dilute its protective role. Similarly, in
Stanford Daily the Justice refused to apply a settled notion of
probable cause in a context that involved individual interests outside the scope of the precedents applied by the Court. The Justice
has also departed from recent Court precedent in his procedural due
process opinions by refusing to require a statutory or constitutional
entitlement as the source of protected liberty interests. Justice Stevens's opinions in these cases were a product less of his personal
policy preferences than his conviction that the particular rule applied by the Court failed to reflect the principles it ostensibly serves.
Justice Stevens has adopted approaches to constitutional problems that emphasize fundamental principles and goals, but not
strict constitutional rules. Often the Justice utilizes a balancing
approach as a technique for applying these principles. Such an approach to constitutional adjudication, however, can easily obscure
the underlying "fundamental" principles. The most notable shortcoming of his balancing process is his failure to articulate why he
finds some interests more important than others. The Justice's first
amendment and equal protection decisions have a result-oriented
" See Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself, and not what we have said
about it."); E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 57-60 (1949).

"I Justice Cardozo, attacking the "tyranny of labels" in constitutional theory, criticized
the tendency of courts to apply a general rule, that was "wrought under the pressures of

particular situations," in another situation where it has little relation to the reasons that
brought it into existence. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934).
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quality that often seems to reflect his own notion of common sense,
rather than a principled basis for assigning priority to one interest
over another. The Justice's decisions in Pacificaand Mini Theatres,
for instance, provide only meager guidance to lower courts and
legislatures that rely on Supreme Court precedent to explicate the
limits of constitutionally permissible lawmaking.
One recurring, and often dispositive, factor in Justice Stevens's
constitutional analysis is the nature of the confrontation between the individual and the state. In situations he views as far from
the central concerns of the Constitution he hesitates to disturb the
status quo. This theme recurs in his procedural due process, first
amendment, equal protection, and fourth amendment opinions:
where "routine" governmental activities are concerned, Justice Stevens is willing to defer to legislative or executive judgments. Thus,
when faced with legislatively specified procedures for health and
safety searches in Barlow's, utility terminations in Memphis Light,
employment dismissals in Bishop, or zoning regulation of theaters
showing sexually explicit films in Mini Theatres, the Justice respected legislative decisions. But when he has addressed individual/state confrontations of a more extraordinary nature, such as the
deprivations of liberty in Meachum and Moody or the search of
innocent third parties in Stanford Daily, he has assigned a greater
role to the federal court in enforcing constitutional protections.
Justice Stevens's use of balancing does not indicate that he has
succumbed to the "dilemma of the realist tradition. '442 Although
Justice Stevens's opinions do reflect a recognition of the irreducible element of "legislating" 43 inherent in Supreme Court decisionmaking, he also acknowledges the need to refer constantly to the
antecedent legislating of the Framers. It is not merely precedential, political, and institutional concerns that limit the Court's
discretion,144 but also the presence of a text not entirely devoid of
substantive meaning. To the extent that the Court can shape the
law and thus serve competing social interests, Justice Stevens appears to recognize that it must do so with primary attention to the
"2Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 252 (1972)
("Realism sees the norms as the product of the institution. But the institution must, by the
logic of its own legitimacy, see its action as the product of the norm. However useful it is to
recognize that the law emerges from what judges do, it does not serve well as a source of the
premises for what judges should do.").
4' See generally P. KURLAND, PoLrrIcs, THE CONsTrrUmON, AND THE WARREN COURT 173-

74 (1970).
"I But see id. at 175-81; A.
100 (1970).

BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoUR AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 81-
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balances already made in the Constitution- 4 '
Although Justice Stevens recognizes the responsibility of coordinate branches of government to uphold the Constitution, to the
extent that nonjudicial bodies engage in a balancing of interests in
their decisionmaking processes, the Justice, with the rest of the
Court, requires that they not act irrationally or arbitrarily. But
Justice Stevens-unlike his fellow Justices-also demands that legislative and administrative lawmaking be the result of a demonstrably rational process by a competent decisionmaker. This is the focus
of the Justice's due process of lawmaking analysis. The decisions of
governmental bodies that implicate substantive constitutional
rights must rest upon legitimate, articulated purposes. Thus, although Justice Stevens often seems to acquiesce in the decisions of
other institutions ostensibly more responsive to the people than the
courts, he does not fail to provide protection against the potential
irrationality of those bodies.
Justice Stevens has adopted a constitutional approach that invites criticism. His penchant for balancing of interests often overshadows the principles underlying his opinions. His departure from
prior judicial interpretations of constitutional guarantees is often
uncritical and terse. He fails to develop fully the potential analytical problems in his constitutional interpretations unless they are
expressly presented by the case. Yet these shortcomings pale once
the Justice's direction becomes clear. His place on the Court has
been to rethink doctrine and to challenge old assumptions as the
Court applies them to new situations. His opinions have been attempts to preserve what is valuable in existing rules while formulating broad doctrines capable of responding to the demands of modern
society. That Justice Stevens's jurisprudence is open to criticism
should not overshadow the value of his innovative approach to the
Constitution.
Jonathan C. Carlson
Alan D. Smith
I' Determining the scope and meaning of the decisions made at the Founding is "a
different responsibility from that of explaining why society would benefit from a judicial
change in the common law." Linde, supra note 441, at 254.

